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ABSTRACT
This paper surveys capital structure theories based on product characteristics and
the structure of input and output markets. In this manner, it extends the work of
Harris and Raviv (1991). Simultaneously, we relate capital structure to decisions
in the input and output markets, such as production and pricing, investments, and
entry and exit. We briefly discuss each of the central papers in these literatures
and relate them to the other models. Next, we present the known empirical evi-
dence that either supports or rejects these models. Finally, we offer our conclu-
sions and elaborate on this review article’s implications for future research.
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In their seminal articles of 1958 and 1963, Modigliani and Miller show
that in a frictionless world without taxes and information asymme-
tries and with no influence of financing choices on corporate invest-
ment decisions, capital structure has no impact on firm value. If this
proposition is reversed, as suggested by Miller (1988), firm value can
be affected by financing decisions if (1) different tax regimes exist,
(2) information asymmetries between the firm’s management and out-
side investors are present, (3) “real” decisions differ across financing
decisions, because of agency costs for example, and/or (4) other fric-
tions, such as costs of financial distress, are introduced.
A recent article by Graham (2003) reviews the vast literature on
taxes. A highly regarded survey on the other capital structure deter-
minants is that of Harris and Raviv (1991), who discuss four
distinctive categories of determinants, namely: agency problems,
information asymmetries, products and product market characteris-
tics, and corporate control contests. In their conclusion, Harris and
Raviv refer to the third determinant as the most promising for future
research:
“In our view, models which relate capital structure to products and inputs
are the most promising. This area is still in its infancy and is short on impli-
cations relating capital structure to industrial organization variables such
as demand and cost parameters, strategic variables, etc.”
(Harris and Raviv (1991), p. 351)
Our article extends the work of Harris and Raviv on the interactions
between capital structure and product markets, both in volume and
content. While the seminal papers in this field were published in the
second half of the 1980’s (and covered by Harris and Raviv), a lot of
new theoretical and – especially – empirical work has emerged since
then. Also, we not only examine product market determinants of capi-
tal structure, but elaborate on the implications of financing choices
for various product market decisions. Firms can use their financial
policy towards product market participants (customers, suppliers,
employees, competitors) to solve asymmetric information and agency
problems. Also, capital structure can serve as a signaling device to
these non-financial stakeholders (NFS), and affect their behavior. This
subdomain of the corporate finance literature bears a clear link with
the industrial organization literature.
728Our survey contains discussions of papers that we consider central
to the development of our understanding of how products and product
markets affect a firm’s financing choices and vice versa. The process
of deciding which papers to include was tedious, and some interesting
papers may have been left out of the discussion, due to a difference
in focus or because of neglect from our part, for which we apologize.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II defines NFS, Sec-
tion III discusses the selected theoretical articles arranged by capital
structure determinants, respectively product market decisions. Sec-
tion IV presents some major empirical papers whereas Section V con-
cludes our article.
II. NON-FINANCIAL STAKEHOLDERS
Non-financial stakeholders have no direct monetary stake in the firm.
Also, they have no direct influence on the firm’s financial policy (no
decision or voting power). However, a firm’s capital structure can
affect NFS both directly, for instance by affecting the probability of
default on their explicit and implicit claims with the firm, as well as
indirectly, for instance by influencing the firm’s production and pricing
decisions. NFS, as a result, are interested in the firm’s financing
choices and firms may be forced (implicitly) to take their NFS’objec-
tives into account when determining their capital structure. Figure 1
gives a broad overview of the relations between the firm and its NFS.
Competitors and entrants may wish to predict the firm’s pricing, pro-
duction and investment decisions in order to respond optimally. By
observing the firm’s financial policy, (potential) competitors may be
able to infer information on the firm’s output market behavior. Cus-
tomers and suppliers prefer solid contracts, depending on product (e.g.,
durability, exclusivity, quality, price) and firm characteristics. They will
assess and price the probability of rupture of their explicit and implicit
contracts with the firm; the firm’s capital structure may be informative
for this purpose. Employees also favor reliable contracts, depending
on input (education, experience, job-specific investments) and job mar-
ket characteristics (e.g., unions, labor opportunities). Finally, the
government can be considered as a special NFS. In contrast to the other
NFS, it has a direct stake in the firm’s results and its income (from
taxes) straightforwardly depends on the firm’s financing choices.
Nevertheless, the government has no direct power over the firm.
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STRUCTURE AND PRODUCT MARKETS
The firm is a set of interrelated contracts among its various input sup-
pliers and the purchasers of its final output good. Following Jensen
and Meckling (1976), this concept of the firm has been translated into
the corporate finance literature. However, the role of NFS in the firm’s
capital structure choice only recently received attention in this litera-
ture. In Section III.A, we discuss the main NFS determinants of capi-
tal structure. The implications of a firm’s capital structure for its deci-
sions in the product market are treated in Section III.B. Our discussion
of the theoretical models is summarized in Table 1.
A. NFS determinants of capital structure
In this section we look at how relationships with NFS influence or
firm‘s capital structure decision. The theoretical literature in this field
basically has raised three issues: expected bankruptcy costs of NFS,
the negotiation power of clients, suppliers and workers, and the com-









1. NFS determinants of Capital Structure
1.1. Expected Bankruptcy Costs of NFS
Cornell and Shapiro, 1987 Implicit claims affect capital structure; a low debt ratio can serve as a pre-commitment
mechanism to make large payouts on implicit contracts.
Titman, 1984 NFS’ expected liquidation costs negatively affect debt ratios.
Maksimovic and Titman, 1991 Firms that wish to maintain a reputation for producing high-quality goods assume lower debt
ratios. When the firm’s assets have a high liquidation value, this effect can be reversed.
1.2. Negotiation Power of NFS vis-à-vis the Firm
Subramaniam, 1998 Leverage can serve as a commitment device against firm-suppliers hold-up problems:
leverage increases the number of suppliers and lowers input prices for a monopolist in
the product market. Trade credit reduces the optimal debt ratio.
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 2000 Subramaniam’s (1998) strategic debt effect is reversed and firm profits are lowered in a
duopoly model unless external economies of scale in the supplier industry and demand elas-
ticity for the firm’s products are small.
Bronars and Deere, 1991 Firms facing a greater threat of unionization choose a higher debt-equity ratio to prevent
paying out quasi-rents from sunk investments to the workforce. The optimal amount of debt




Perotti and Spier, 1993 By exchanging junior debt for equity, shareholders alter their own incentives to invest and
can extract concessions from senior creditors.
Sarig, 1998 Firms can increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers of specialized production fac-
tors by lowering their debt ratio. The use of debt increases with the market alternatives of
employees.
2. Impact of Capital Structure on Product Market Decisions
2.1. Production and Pricing Decisions
Brander and Lewis, 1986 Debt increases the firm’s aggressiveness in the output market through a limited liability
effect.
Brander and Lewis, 1988 With fixed bankruptcy costs, the effects of Brander and Lewis (1986) are replicated. With
proportional bankruptcy costs, the relation between debt and output is convex (U-shaped).
Showalter, 1995 Under Bertrand competition, the output market aggressiveness of firms depends on the type
of uncertainty. Under cost uncertainty, debt makes competition tougher; under demand uncer-
tainty, debt makes competition softer. The results under Cournot competition are not affected
by the type of uncertainty.
Wanzenried, 2003 The relation between product differentiation and the optimal debt level is U-shaped under
Cournot and Bertrand competition. When competing in strategic substitutes, the probability
of bankruptcy increases in product substitutability and vice versa for competition in strate-
gic complements. A rise in demand volatility induces firms to increase their debt.
Dasgupta and Shin, 1999 Information sharing through a trade association decreases aggressiveness in the output mar-




Glazer, 1994 Long-term debt makes firms compete less aggressively and makes prices fluctuate more.
Faure-Grimaud, 2000 Debt can have anti-competitive effects when a reward that induces firms to repay their credi-
tors instead of strategically defaulting is included in debt contracts.
Maksimovic, 1988 The firm’s debt level affects the viability of collusive agreements. The maximal debt ratio sus-
taining collusion declines in the discount rate and increases in the number of firms in the indus-
try and in the elasticity of demand. The effect of capacity constraints depends on the proper-
ies of demand and cost, the discount rate and the number of firms in the industry. Specific
financial instruments, such as warrants and convertibles, also affect the collusive debt level.
Spagnolo, 2000 Debt has anti-competitive effects when collusive credit markets or banking groups force
firms to behave debtholder-friendly.
Dasgupta and Titman, 1998 Under Nash competition, pre-committing with debt reduces market aggressiveness. Under
Stackelberg competition, a less levered leader has incentives to react aggressively to debt
increases. Optimal debt rises as the liquidation value rises and falls as competition rises.
2.2. Investment Decisions
Myers, 1977 The optimal debt ratio is inversely related to the ratio of the firm value accounted for by
growth options relative to the value of assets in place.
Dotan and Ravid, 1985 Taking on more debt increases the probability of incurring an accounting loss, which reduces
the present value of non-debt related tax shields. So, debt and investments are negatively related.
Hart and Moore, 1995 Long-term debt is more optimal in curbing managers’incentives to overinvest than short-term
debt. The debt-equity mix and the seniority structure of debt depend on the relative
profitability of assets in place versus new investments.7
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4 Author(s) Results
Allen, 2000 Strategic bankruptcy costs should include the costs due to the delay in investment decisions
during the bankruptcy process. This strategic cost depends on the relative solvency of firms,
fixed capacity costs and the state of demand. Marginal bankruptcy costs together with tax
benefits determine the firm’s debt ratio. As a result, similar firms in one industry can have
different capital structures.
2.3. Predatory Models of Entry and Exit
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986 Incumbents prey upon entrants by decreasing current entrant profitability when entrants are
uncertain about future profitability. The prey can be forced to exit the market if it is inca-
pable of renewing capital or financing new projects.
Poitevin, 1989 Information asymmetries in financial markets can increase the entrant’s financial vulnera-
bility. A separating equilibrium where a low-cost entrant signals with debt and a high-cost
entrant with equity exists. Incumbent incentives to prey are a function of the entrant’s finan-
cial structure.
Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990 Agency problems in financial contracting can give rise to predation. Shallow pockets are
mostly optimal.
Fernandez-Ruiz, 2004 Adverse selection problems in financial contracting can give rise to predation. The proba-
bility of predation depends on the cost of preying, the difference in profit with or without
the entrant, and the distortion created by the predatory action. Deep pockets are mostly opti-
mal.
Rotemberg and Scharfstein, 1990 Firms choose to pay out cash (dividends, stock repurchases), depending on whether indus-





Maurer, 1999 Predation by internally financed rivals reduces the probability of refinancing, which is lower
under Stackelberg competition.
Lambrecht, 2001 High leverage of incumbents leads to faster entry. Higher operating profits, lower debt repay-
ments, larger incremental gains from becoming a monopolist, and higher bankruptcy costs
help firms to survive. The relative importance of these factors depends on macro-economic
variables, such as interest rates, profit volatility and profit growth rates. Finally, macro-
economic variables also influence the order in which firms default if firms differ sufficiently.
Kanatas and Qi, 2001 Short-term and bank debt induce firms to act strategically in the output market to dis-
tort information to investors and induce firms to prey. Short-term debt is decreasing in
concentration. Long-term debt is increasing in price elasticity of demand.1. Expected bankruptcy costs of NFS
By definition, expected bankruptcy costs are influenced by both the
likelihood and the magnitude of costs incurred by NFS upon the firm’s
bankruptcy. The likelihood is largely determined by the firm’s capital
structure. Generally, it can be assumed that a rise in leverage increases
this probability, although not linearly. Other elements of financing
policy such as debt ownership, maturity, covenants, etc. may also play
an important role (e.g., Gilson et al. (1990)). The magnitude of bank-
ruptcy costs is determined by direct (switching) costs and implicit
costs, which are discussed by Cornell and Shapiro (1987). If NFS are
rational, they price these expected bankruptcy costs when negotiating
with the firm, thereby affecting firm value. Based on this argument,
Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that firms
may wish to pre-commit to a low likelihood of bankruptcy by lowering
their debt ratio.
Cornell and Shapiro (1987) define implicit contracts as claims that
are nebulous and state-contingent so that the costs of writing a contract
on them are prohibitive. A second characteristic is that they cannot be
unbundled and traded independently from the goods and services the
firm sells. Defaulting on implicit claims does not automatically trig-
ger bankruptcy. However, the value of implicit claims is sensitive to
the firm’s financial condition, even when bankruptcy is remote.
Implicit claims also suffer from a time-inconsistency problem, namely
how to assure NFS that the firm’s future decisions will involve large
payouts on these claims. One solution is for the firm to make claim-
specific investments, whose value is tied to the payouts on implicit
contracts. Another solution is to alter the firm’s financial structure as
a pre-positioning mechanism, as argued hereafter.
In a two-period model Titman (1984) examines how the firm’s
liquidation policy affects its NFS. Customers and other NFS assess the
probability of liquidation in period 1 for every state of nature and
price this probability rationally. The firm thus bears the liquidation
costs imposed on NFS ex ante. Titman now shows that a value-
maximizing firm adopts an enforceable policy of only liquidating in
those states of nature where the value of the assets if liquidated
exceeds their value if not liquidated by an amount greater than the
liquidation costs imposed on NFS. The firm thus will be liquidated
only in those states of nature (qi) where d∞(qi)∞K∞(M*)∞∞–∞∞C∞(qi)∞∞>∞∞V1∞(qi)
with d∞(qi)∞K∞(M*) the liquidation value in state qi, C∞(qi), the costs
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tion costs C∞(qi) equal the selling price of the firm’s products if not
liquidated minus the selling price after liquidation.
Proposition 1: a firm will liquidate according to its optimal policy if
its financing contracts are chosen such that:
It is bankrupt in all those states of nature and only those states in
which V1∞(qi)∞∞<∞∞d∞(qi)∞∞–∞∞K∞∞–∞∞C∞(qi).
(a) D∞∞≥∞∞d∞(qi)∞K∞∞–∞∞C∞(qi) whenever the firm is bankrupt, and
(b) Pf∞∞+∞∞D∞∞≥∞∞d∞(qi)∞K,∞∞∀∞qi with Pf the claims of preferred stockholders and
(c) D the claims of debtholders.
A crucial assumption in this framework is that stockholders and
debtholders have different incentives to liquidate. Debtholders liqui-
date in more states of nature than equityholders, and the probability
of liquidation depends on the bankruptcy decision.1 Liquidation in an
additional period 1 state qi lowers the firm’s value in period 0 by
[V1∞(qi)∞∞–∞∞d∞(qi)∞K∞∞+∞∞C∞(qi)]∞p∞(qi), with p∞(qi) a discount factor. In this
framework, capital structure thus “controls” future liquidation deci-
sions through the bankruptcy mechanism. As a result, financing
choices serve as a pre-positioning mechanism to maximize firm value.
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) extend Titman’s (1984) theory that
NFS’ pricing of future liquidation costs affects firm value and capital
structure to situations where NFS do not suffer such direct costs if the
firm goes out of business. Rather, they focus on firms trying to main-
tain a reputation for product quality, which can be considered as an
implicit contract. Firm value will be affected by the reluctance of NFS
to deal with a near-bankrupt firm as financial distress may affect the
firm’s incentives to honor its implicit contracts. Maksimovic and Tit-
man investigate in which situations debt influences the firm’s ability
to credibly offer high-quality goods. As NFS price this credibility,
capital structure affects firm value.
In their framework, firms do not need to be on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. In Proposition 6, they even show that if there is no probability
of financial distress or bankruptcy, a levered firm has a greater ten-
dency to reduce quality. The reason is that a reduction in quality has
a similar effect as obtaining an (involuntary) loan from customers as
profits rise in the short run. This “loan” will be repaid through reduc-
tions in future revenues after customers have priced the decrease in
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the claims of existing creditors are diluted. So, debtholders share the
costs of the loan with shareholders.2 Now, firms that experience a
financial shortfall may reduce quality rather than borrow in cases
where the costs associated with borrowing at unfavorable terms more
than offset the reputational benefits of being considered a high-quality
producer. Maksimovic and Titman specify conditions under which
firms will lower their debt ratio (which depend on the ratio of low-
quality producers in the market, the relative cost of producing low- and
high-quality goods, the firm’s financial health, dividend policy, etc.).
Finally, Maksimovic and Titman examine the role of the firm’s liqui-
dation (salvage) value in capital structure decisions. They show that
the value of a firm with an opportunity to liquidate may be lower than
that of a firm that doesn’t have this chance. Two ways to commit to
not liquidating are to have a low salvage value or to change the
liquidation policy of the firm by issuing senior claims whose face
value exceeds the firm’s liquidation value without causing bankruptcy.
This way, the equityholders never choose to liquidate. As in Titman
(1984), such a capital structure has the property that the firm goes
bankrupt only in those states of nature where the firm would opti-
mally choose to liquidate.
2. Negotiation power of NFS vis-à-vis the firm
As the firm is a nexus of contracting relationships, it is constantly
negotiating with its customers, suppliers and workers. The outcome of
these negotiations is determined by the relative bargaining power of
the different players, which can be influenced by financial policy. Sub-
ramaniam (1998) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (2000) show
that a firm can be forced to increase its leverage when it has too much
negotiation power vis-à-vis its suppliers. Other papers look at how
leverage affects a firm’s bargaining position with unions. Bronars and
Deere (1991) and Perotti and Spier (1993) show that a firm can extract
more rents from its workers by raising debt. By contrast, Sarig (1998)
finds that high debt diminishes a firm’s negotiation power when bar-
gaining with specialized input providers.
Subramaniam (1998) looks at how leverage influences the firm-
supplier relationship for a monopolist dealing with a competitive sup-
pliers’market. He shows that the monopolist is eager to behave oppor-
tunistically, by asking for lower input prices or demanding lower input
738quantities. Proposition 1 states the firm-supplier hold-up problem: for
an unlevered firm, the quantity that maximizes shareholder value in
the presence of firm-supplier interactions is lower than Q*, the quan-
tity produced in the absence of such interactions. Unfortunately for the
monopolist, suppliers anticipate this hold-up behavior, and fewer sup-
pliers service the firm, thereby increasing its input costs. However,
the monopolist can pre-commit to producing a certain quantity. Sub-
ramaniam examines the debt ratio as such a commitment device.
He shows that due to limited liability, shareholders of a levered firm
prefer to produce more than debtholders do, or than is produced by an
unlevered firm (e.g., Brander and Lewis (1986)). Although the opti-
mal output level is increasing in leverage, the agency costs of debt are
also increasing. Proposition 2 states that for small levels of debt, the
number of suppliers servicing the monopolist increases with debt.
For larger levels of debt, the agency costs associated with the
increased debt grow larger than the benefits. Proposition 3 states that
it is in the shareholders’ interest to have a strictly positive debt level.
Subramaniam even models in Corollary 2 an equilibrium level of debt
where benefits outweigh costs and where the monopolist produces Q*.
The final section of the paper discusses the influence of trade credit
on the model. Trade credit can change the results as suppliers may
become reluctant to accept debt since it influences the default risk on
their trade credit. Subramaniam, however, finds that if suppliers price
the trade credit correctly, a small level of debt is still optimal.
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (2000) extend the above model
and show that when duopolists in the output market can influence
input quantities or prices after suppliers have entered a fully competi-
tive input market, Subramaniam’s (1998) strategic advantage of debt
when selling substitutes may be cancelled by lowering input costs of
the firm’s rival.
In their model, a firm’s leverage is also used to pre-commit to pro-
ducing more than the Cournot outcome (Brander and Lewis (1986)).
As a result, more inputs are required and more suppliers are lured into
the input market. Proposition 2 shows that if there are sufficient exter-
nal economies of scale in the supplier industry, a unilateral increase
in debt increases the number of suppliers servicing both the firm and
its rival and the individual output of each firm increases. The conse-
quence of the rise in production at the industry level is that profits are
lowered. For the levered firm, market share has not risen because the
rival’s output has risen proportionally, and the lower output price can
739depress the firm’s profits more than the lower input price raises profits.
Proposition 3 posits that in a duopoly, both firms prefer debt financing
if the external economies of scale in the supplier industry and demand
elasticity of the final product are small. Otherwise, firms are fully
equity financed.
Bronars and Deere (1991) argue that if workers are likely to
establish a union, raising debt can protect the wealth of shareholders.
In the presence of collective bargaining, firms tend to underinvest in
assets that are sunk to some extent as the quasi-rents generated by
these investments accrue partially to the workforce. By issuing debt,
the firm lowers the amount of quasi-rents to be bargained on with the
union as a fixed share of earnings is needed to service the debt. To the
extent that labor compensation is lowered, raising debt can increase
shareholder wealth. Debt is incurred until the marginal expected gain
from limiting the union’s payoff equals the expected increase in bank-
ruptcy costs. In this model, the probability of bankruptcy should be
positive; otherwise shareholders are unable to shield any revenues
from the union. The optimal amount of debt is shown to depend on
the probability of forming a union, the nature of the bargaining
process, and the probability of bankruptcy.
Perotti and Spier (1993) examine how the underinvestment effect
induced by debt can serve as a bargaining tool to force the renegoti-
ation of senior claims (by creditors, employees or suppliers) through
the exchange of junior debt for equity. In a two-period dynamic model,
they look at the conflict of interest between shareholders and risk-
averse workers represented by a union. Outstanding debt can make
the shareholders’ threat not to invest more credible, and will lead to
wage concessions over a larger set of states of nature. The presence
of junior debt can also reduce the union’s share of the surplus during
the contract renegotiation stage.
In their model, second-period investment is needed to guarantee full
payment of the union’s claim. They first show that when renegotiation
is impossible and debt-for-equity exchanges are not feasible, the firm
only invests when profits are high. If renegotiation is possible, but
debt-for-equity exchanges are not, wages are only renegotiated if the
firm is not able to pay these. Finally, Perotti and Spier examine the
situation where contracts can be renegotiated and debt-for-equity
exchanges are feasible. If only shareholders and workers negotiate,
then debt-for-equity exchanges have strategic value (unions will agree
to larger wage concessions), new investments are always made and
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When debtholders are also part of the renegotiations, similar results
hold, but the union now receives part of the return from new invest-
ments.
Sarig (1998) looks at how the supply of specialized production fac-
tors interacts with the leverage of the firm that employs them. He uses
a bargaining model to determine the dependency of the outcome of
wage negotiations on capital structure. Focusing on the supply of firm-
specific human capital, Sarig shows that the workforce’s share of the
quasi-rents to specialization increases with debt (Proposition 1). This
effect realizes during the wage negotiation process, where a levered
firm is more vulnerable to bankruptcy after the supply of specialized
production factors is suspended. It is clear that when debt weakens the
bargaining position of shareholders, they would like to use less of it,
but Proposition 2 shows that shareholder wealth may decrease fol-
lowing a reduction in leverage. The reason is that the resulting
decrease in labor costs benefits both shareholders and debtholders.
Finally, considering the employees’ bargaining power, Proposition 3
states that the use of debt increases with the market alternatives of
employees. As employees have more market alternatives, the quasi-
rents to be bargained on decrease. Sarig also argues that unionized
labor can demand wages exceeding their market alternatives, even
when there is no firm-specific human capital. As a consequence, firms
use less debt if their employees’ labor union is powerful.
3. Market structure and competition
Athird important NFS determinant of capital structure is market struc-
ture and the behavior and characteristics of competitors in the output
market. As most of the papers discussing these determinants also deal
with the effects of capital structure on product market decisions, we
discuss all papers on strategic market interactions in Section III.B
hereafter.
B. Impact of capital structure on product market decisions
In a world with perfectly competitive product markets, perfect capi-
tal markets and no information asymmetries or agency problems,
financial policy does not interfere with product market decisions. But
upon introducing imperfections, firms may increase their value by
741strategically changing their behavior, depending on their own and their
rivals’ capital structure. In our framework, we distinguish between
three categories of product market decisions. Afirst category concerns
production and pricing decisions. Models of imperfect competition
show that a firm can use its capital structure to pre-commit to a strate-
gic output or price level. Second, investments are most directly
affected by managers’ incentives. Managers may have a tendency to
overinvest in market share and size, and capital structure can be used
to restrain these incentives. Simultaneously, too much debt can result
in underinvesting in positive NPV projects. Third, financial structure
can influence entry and exit decisions through incumbent predatory
behavior. Figure 2 presents the general framework in which product
market decisions are made and by which they are affected.
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FIGURE 2
A competition model1. Production and pricing decisions
Equityholders and debtholders may disagree on the product market
strategy the firm should follow. The reason is that their payoffs dif-
fer. Debtholders are only entitled to fixed debt servicing payments
whereas shareholders receive residual payoffs and thus prefer riskier
projects. The seminal paper by Brander and Lewis (1986) shows that
debt increases the firm’s output market aggressiveness as managers
acting in the interests of shareholders maximize profits over only
(a more limited number of) good states of the world. Brander and
Lewis (1988) find that this model outcome is affected by the type of
bankruptcy costs (fixed or proportional). Showalter (1995) shows that
the results are also sensitive to the form of competition (Bertrand or
Cournot) and the type of uncertainty (demand or cost) that firms face.
Wanzenried (2003) examines the role of product differentiation and
demand volatility. Dasgupta and Shin (1999) argue that trade associ-
ations can reduce the product market aggressiveness of levered firms.
Glazer (1994) examines the role of debt maturity and finds that long-
term debt softens competition. Similarly, Faure-Grimaud (2000) finds
that including a reward in debt contracts makes firms compete less
aggressively. Maksimovic (1988) shows that the amount of debt
affects the willingness of managers to honor collusive agreements in
repeated oligopolies. Spagnolo (2000) uses Maksimovic’s model to
show that debt can also have anti-competitive effects when creditors
export their own collusive behavior to output markets. Finally, Das-
gupta and Titman (1998) demonstrate that the relation between
leverage and pricing strategies depends on the nature of the competi-
tive game (Nash or Stackelberg).
Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that financial structure changes the
relative payoffs to stock- and debtholders, which influences a firm’s
product market behavior. They find that debt intensifies firm competi-
tive behavior due to a limited liability effect. As debt rises, low (mar-
ginal) value states of nature become irrelevant to the shareholders for
the firm is turned over to its debtholders. So, as firms take on more debt,
they pursue output strategies that raise returns in good states and lower
returns in bad states. Brander and Lewis now show that increasing out-
put enlarges the variance in profits. As a result, the Nash equilibrium
production level in a Cournot duopoly model is increasing in leverage
(Proposition 1). Proposition 2 shows that if one firm increases its debt,
it increases its output at the expense of rival output. Propositions 1
743and 2 thus state that a high debt level credibly pre-commits a firm to
following an aggressive output stance. Debtholders likely will take this
limited liability effect into account in their bond prices. Brander and
Lewis show that for sufficiently low debt levels, the strategic effect of
debt compensates for this negative price effect. For larger debt levels,
the costs of the conflict of interest between debt- and equityholders out-
weigh the benefits of strategic debt. In equilibrium, industry debt will
be strictly positive, so that more output is produced than in the tradi-
tional industrial organization oligopoly model.
In a duopoly model similar to that of their 1986 paper, Brander and
Lewis (1988) find that the form of bankruptcy costs (fixed versus pro-
portional) influences the outcome of their earlier model. The reason
is that bankruptcy costs affect the payoffs to debt- and equityholders.
The results under fixed bankruptcy costs are comparable to those of
their 1986 limited liability model: own output is increasing in the debt
level (Proposition 1), albeit starting from a lower level than the
Cournot outcome of unlevered firms (Proposition 3). Proposition 2
states that a unilateral debt increase raises own output and decreases
rival output. With proportional bankruptcy costs, firms always produce
less than the Cournot outcome of unlevered firms, and the strategic
effect of debt on output is a convex (U-shaped) function of leverage.
Proposition 5 states that at low (but positive) debt levels, output is
decreasing in own debt and increasing in rival debt. At high levels of
debt, reverse results emerge.
When considering how limited liability influences the optimal debt
level, Brander and Lewis find that the form of bankruptcy costs plays
an important role. Whereas fixed bankruptcy costs induce firms to
hold higher debt ratios, proportional bankruptcy costs have more
mixed effects. Absent all other capital structure determinants, firms
prefer to hold no debt at all as then rival output and the own proba-
bility of bankruptcy are minimized. But if other capital structure
determinants induce firms to hold positive debt levels, strategic debt
effects might lead firms to hold higher or lower debt levels, depending
on the state of the world. Brander and Lewis also examine the effect
of a rival’s bankruptcy (strategic bankruptcy effect). As the payoff of
increasing output rises through this additional effect, firms raise own
output and industry output increases.
Showalter (1995) shows that Brander and Lewis’(1986) conclusion
that firms have a strategic incentive to increase their debt depends
both on the type of strategic interactions within the product market and
744on the type of uncertainty faced by the firm. Whereas Cournot (out-
put) competition induces firms to compete in strategic complements,
Bertrand (price) competing firms are generally assumed to compete in
strategic substitutes. Consequently, the conclusions of the Brander and
Lewis model may be reversed.
In a duopoly model similar to Brander and Lewis (1986), but
where firms compete in prices (Bertrand competition), Showalter
shows that the assumption that marginal profits are higher in the bet-
ter states of the world only holds under demand uncertainty; under
cost uncertainty, this assumption is violated. In Theorem 1, Showal-
ter shows that under demand uncertainty, the firm increases its price
as debt increases, which is followed by its rival. When costs are
uncertain, the firm prefers lower prices as debt increases and is again
followed by its rival. As an increase in prices amplifies the states in
which equityholders are residual claimants, the limited liability effect
of debt is strategically advantageous to the firm under demand uncer-
tainty, but harmful under cost uncertainty. Therefore, the results of a
model weighing this strategic benefit against the cost of extra debt
are that under cost uncertainty, firms hold no debt whereas the debt
level is positive under demand uncertainty. In case of Cournot com-
petition, the type of uncertainty is shown to have no effect on the
model outcome; so, the Brander and Lewis (1986) results continue
to hold.
In a two-stage game, Wanzenried (2003) studies the strategic use of
debt when firms face demand uncertainty. In this framework, she
examines how the substitutability of products and the volatility of
demand affect financial structure. In Proposition 1, Wanzenried con-
firms the results of Showalter (1995). Debt induces firms to raise their
output and the profitability of boosting debt depends on the nature of
competition. If products are strategic complements (substitutes), higher
debt raises (lowers) profits under Cournot competition. Under Bertrand
competition, results reverse as the limited liability effect of debt induces
firms to raise their price (and reduce total output). In Proposition 2,
Wanzenried shows that the relation between product differentiation and
the optimal debt level is U-shaped, under Cournot ánd Bertrand com-
petition. When products are highly substitutable, competition is fierce
and firms increase their output levels in the second stage, as pre-
committed to in the first stage by increasing their leverage. When prod-
ucts are less substitutable, and thus more differentiated, firms can
increase their output levels without suffering a decline in profits. Firms
745thus again increase their period-one debt level.3 At an average level of
substitutability, both effects are minimal and firms have minimal debt
ratios. In Proposition 3, Wanzenried shows that for competition in
strategic substitutes, the probability of bankruptcy is increasing in
product substitutability, and vice versa for competition in strategic
complements. Finally, Proposition 4 shows that a more volatile demand
for the firm’s products increases its indebtedness, ceteris paribus. In
this setting, the strategic benefits of increasing debt dominate the nega-
tive effects of enlarged bankruptcy risk.
Dasgupta and Shin (1999) examine how the possibility of sharing
information through a trade association can soften the aggressive out-
put stance of levered firms. They show that one way of mitigating
Brander and Lewis’ (1986) limited liability effect is to resolve
demand uncertainty. Dasgupta and Shin model a Cournot duopoly
where firms have asymmetric access to information on future
demand. Proposition 1 shows that when both firms are completely
equity financed, they do not share information. In this framework,
the less informed firm has an incentive to increase its leverage. The
reason is that when this firm has risky debt outstanding, there is a sig-
nificant benefit for the better informed firm to share its information
on future market demand. If the better informed firm conveys this
information, the other firm will lower its output when demand will
be low.4 The levered firm then benefits from free-riding on the infor-
mation supplied by the better informed, unlevered firm, which in turn
benefits from the softer competition. Proposition 4 derives sufficient
conditions for firms to form a trade association. These conditions
weigh the information free-riding benefit against the loss due to the
destruction of commitment power. Finally, Proposition 5 concludes
that a trade association is always formed in the case of symmetric
firms. The reason is that if both firms are symmetric, they have an
equal chance (nature’s choice) of being the Stackelberg information
leader.
Glazer (1994) examines the role of debt maturity structure in
product market competition. He uses the model of Brander and Lewis
(1986) to show that long-term debt makes firms compete less aggres-
sively than similar firms with short-term debt or no debt at all.5
In Glazer’s framework, firms raise long-term debt at the beginning
of the first period and repay it at the end of the second period. Period 1
profits cannot (entirely) leave the firm and thus can be thought of as
servicing already part of the debt; they are not enough to completely
746“repay” the debt, however. This “remaining” debt affects the compe-
titive outcome in the second period through the Brander and Lewis’
limited liability effect. As a result, a duopolist has an incentive to
lower its rival’s debt in the second period. Glazer now proves in
Proposition 1 that a firm produces less than the period 1 optimizing
output in order to lower the rival’s aggressiveness in period 2 and
maximize its own profits.6 Glazer goes on to show that for symmetric
firms, period 1 production is lower than the Cournot output (and lower
than the output with short-term debt). Lengthening maturity structure
thus makes competition less aggressive. A side-effect of his model is
that prices fluctuate more if firms have long-term debt outstanding.
The reason is that firms tend to behave less collusively as the maturity
date of their debt comes closer.
In a framework similar to Brander and Lewis (1986), Faure-
Grimaud (2000) shows that debt causes firms to behave less aggres-
sively once firms and lenders sign a debt contract that induces firms
to repay their creditors instead of strategically defaulting. This contract
resembles a standard debt contract (fixed payments, control is turned
to lenders after default), with an additional possibility of granting the
firm a reward.7 When not rewarded, the firm bears an opportunity
cost, which can be interpreted as a bankruptcy cost. This dead-weight
loss is proportional to the expected size of the default. The more
aggressive the output stance of the firm, the higher the probability of
not getting the reward, and thus the higher the firm’s expected bank-
ruptcy costs. This negative financial distress effect of debt can domi-
nate the positive limited liability effect and can, as shown in Propo-
sition 1, reduce the output level of a levered firm. So, debt can make
firms less aggressive in order to limit the size of the default and to
improve the odds of getting the reward. Furthermore, in Proposition 2,
Faure-Grimaud shows that output is decreasing in the firm’s own debt
and increasing in rival debt.
Maksimovic (1988) examines how debt influences the attainability
of collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies, and which firm and
industry characteristics shape this effect. He finds that for repeated
oligopolies, capital structure endogeneously determines the type of
equilibrium (Cournot competition versus collusion) in the product
market. Collusive agreements last as long as for every player, the pay-
off of deviating is lower than the payoff of colluding. An increase in
leverage is shown to increase the payoff of deviating as the generated
surplus accrues entirely to the equityholders (residual claimants).
747Maksimovic looks at the sustainability conditions of a trigger strategy
where all firms produce Cournot quantities after deviating. He shows
that the maximal debt ratio for which the trigger strategy is sustain-
able declines in the discount rate and increases in the number of firms
in the industry. He also finds that a higher demand elasticity increases
this sustainable debt ratio. Next, Maksimovic discusses the impact of
capacity constraints. On the one hand, capacity constraints restrain a
firm from producing the deviation output, which lowers the payoff
from deviating. On the other hand, capacity constraints restrain other
firms from effectively punishing the deviator as producing the higher
Cournot output may be unattainable in the short run. He shows that
the relative effect of capacity constraints depends on the properties of
demand and cost, the discount rate and the number of firms in the
industry. Finally, Maksimovic investigates how specific financial
instruments, such as warrants and convertibles, affect the collusive
debt level. In his model, these instruments serve as a “tax” on the cash
flow to equity as they lower the residual payoff after deviating. By
strategically choosing the exercise price of the warrants, a firm can
provide its rivals with a guarantee against cheating. Issuing convert-
ible debt has the mixed effect of raising leverage while simultane-
ously limiting the payoff from deviating.
Spagnolo (2000) uses the framework of Maksimovic (1988) to show
that debt can also have anti-competitive, i.e. collusive effects. He
shows that collusive credit markets or large banking groups can export
their own collusive behavior to output markets by forcing firms to
behave prudently. Creditors (implicitly) force firms to take creditor-
friendly actions that reduce agency costs of debt (such as hiring
managers who have a reputation at stake, making managers’contracts
less dependent on shareholder value, etc.). These creditor-friendly
actions, which dampen the limited liability effect of debt, are sus-
tainable if managerial contracts can be made renegotiation-proof.
In Spagnolo’s model, that this can be achieved by the power to veto
renegotiation or by developing information networks that render secret
renegotiation impossible (e.g., being represented on the firm’s board),
as shown in Proposition 5.
Dasgupta and Titman (1998) investigate how leverage, by affecting
the cost of capital, influences a firm’s pricing strategy under Bertrand
competition. They find that the nature of the competitive game (Nash
or Stackelberg) affects the relation between leverage and prices. Das-
gupta and Titman use a two-period model, where firms may invest in
748market share in period 1 by lowering their prices to increase their
period 2 cash flows. Proposition 1 states that first-period prices are
increasing in the level of debt. If firms increase their leverage in this
framework, they increase their cost of capital. The reason is that out-
standing (long-term) debt increases the cost of new borrowing and
thus increases the discount rate at which period 2 cash flows are dis-
counted. As a result, firms care less about period 2 income and raise
their prices in period 1. The reaction of rivals depends on their reac-
tion curve. Two opposing effects are at work. On the one hand, when
a firm increases its price, the rival can increase its profitability by
increasing its own price as prices are strategic substitutes. On the other
hand, when a firm increases its price, the rival’s borrowing costs are
reduced due to a rising profitability, and investments in market share
become more attractive. Then, the rival will lower its price. Under
Nash price competition, firms have an incentive to commit to a less
aggressive pricing policy as this will induce the rival to also price less
aggressively. Outstanding senior debt can be used as such a commit-
ment device as it raises the cost of new borrowing and thus reduces
the incentives to gain market share. So, firms will have higher debt
ratios, ceteris paribus. Under Stackelberg price competition, a rela-
tively less levered firm can steal away market share from its rival by
lowering its price as it places a higher value on the period 2 payoff
than a highly levered firm (Proposition 7). Finally, the model shows
that an inelastic demand reduces the benefits of committing to a higher
price, and so firms raise less debt. Another prediction of the model is
that firms in industries with larger asset liquidation values may have
higher debt ratios. The reason is that higher liquidation values decrease
the cost of debt, thereby inducing firms to increase their debt levels.
However, this latter positive effect can be undone when the lower
discount rate increases the rival’s incentives to invest in market share.
Depending on the state of nature, one of these two effects will domi-
nate.
2. Investment Decisions
Debt influences investments, both directly and indirectly through
interest rates. In this section, we focus on the direct, strategic effects
of debt on investments,8 thus leaving out the models that deal with
interest rates. The seminal paper by Myers (1977) demonstrates the
existence of an underinvestment effect induced by risky debt. Dotan
749and Ravid (1985) show that through non-debt related tax shields,
investments also decrease in leverage. Models focusing on managerial
incentives (e.g., Jensen (1986)) show that high debt can curb negative
NPV investments in market share and size. Hart and Moore (1995)
take both under- and overinvestment effects into account to determine
optimal leverage, debt maturity and seniority structure. Finally, Allen
(2000) shows that high debt can put firms at a strategic disadvantage
through a delay in investments when competition is imperfect.
Myers’(1977) seminal paper introduces conflicts of interest between
debt- and equityholders into the framework of optimal capital struc-
ture. He shows that managers acting in the interest of shareholders
may forego positive NPV projects if these projects’ payoffs largely
accrue to the firm’s creditors. So, without any (tax) advantages to debt
financing, a firm with access to profitable investment projects should
hold no debt at all. In a more realistic setting, his model concludes that
the optimal debt ratio should be inversely related to the ratio of the
value of the firm accounted for by growth options relative to the value
of assets in place. Underinvestment incentives thus directly link capi-
tal structure to a firm’s investment opportunities. The reason is that
growth options demand discretionary investment decisions by the
firm’s managers.
Dotan and Ravid (1985) extend the work of DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980)9 to take into account the positive relation between investments
and non-debt related tax shields. Firms that take on more debt have
an increased probability of incurring accounting losses, which reduces
the present value of non-debt related tax shields resulting from invest-
ments in capital goods.
Dotan and Ravid use a one-period model in which they endogenize
the investment decision in a world without taxes and debt, and than
gradually introduce both, endogenizing the leverage decision. They
show that firm value maximization results from the simultaneous
determination of output level and capital structure. Proposition 1 states
that optimal capital investment is a decreasing function of the debt
level. Corollary 2 shows that the simultaneous optimization of capi-
tal stock and leverage results in a higher debt ratio than in case where
leverage is optimized for the optimal capital stock of an unlevered
firm. They then look at how exogenous determinants of either invest-
ment or capital structure affect both endogenous variables, showing in
Proposition 2 that an increase in the tax rate leads to a lower optimal
capacity level and a higher optimal debt level. Proposition 3 shows
750that increases in the expected price of the firm’s product lead to greater
optimal capacity and lower leverage.
In many models, managers are assumed to maximize total firm
value or shareholder value. But managers may be more interested in
maximizing a mix of shareholder value and organizational surplus,
which includes benefits accruing from size, growth, above-market
salaries, overstaffing, etc. Jensen (1986) states that the greater the
amount of free cash flows firms generate the greater the managerial
incentives to maximize this organizational surplus. Free cash flows
are hereby defined as the discretionary cash flows after funding all
positive NPV projects. Exchanging debt for equity has a negative
impact on free cash flows as debt effectively bonds managers to pay
out cash flows. Furthermore, as pointed out by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), debt-for-equity exchanges where the amount of equity owned
by managers is held constant increase the relative amount of equity
owned by managers and thus better align their incentives with those
of shareholders. Thus, by increasing debt, the firm might curb
managers’ incentives to invest in size and market share, thereby
decreasing firm aggressiveness.
In the same spirit, Hart and Moore (1995) explain why companies
issue hard (i.e. senior, non-postponable) long-term debt to curb
managers. In their model, they use debt to trade off overinvestment
(Jensen (1986)) and underinvestment (Myers (1977)) incentives. Over-
investment resulting from empire building projects stems from a lack
of hard claims (non-postponable short-term debt that makes excess
cash scarce and senior long-term debt that prevents managers from
borrowing against current assets’future earnings). Too much borrow-
ing causes current assets to be ‘over-mortgaged’ and could force a
firm to underinvest in profitable projects. The trade-off between both
effects determines the optimal debt-equity mix and the mix of junior
and senior debt. As for the maturity structure of the debt, Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 show that firms optimally use only long-term debt to
balance the two effects. The debt-equity mix depends on the relative
profitability of assets in place versus new investments: with a lot of
new profitable projects, (long-term) debt should be modest and vice
versa if current assets are profitable. In an extension of the model,
Hart and Moore derive the distributional assumptions of assets in place
and investment opportunities under which a mix of senior and junior
long-term debt is more optimal than a simple long-term debt contract
(Propositions 4, 5 and 6).
751Allen (2000) shows how high debt can increase expected bank-
ruptcy costs through the strategic effect of a delay in investment
decisions when product market competition is imperfect. This strate-
gic effect depends inter alia on the (relative) solvency of both players,
fixed capacity costs and the state of demand. In Allen’s model, firms
weigh this strategic effect against the tax advantage of debt to
determine their capital structure.
Allen looks at two identical duopolists in a two-period model
where investment and financing decisions are made simultaneously
at the beginning of every period. Afterwards, output equal to capacity
is produced, the state of demand is revealed, prices are set, and taxes
and payments to securityholders are made. If a firm cannot meet its
obligations, it goes bankrupt and its investment decisions in the next
period are delayed. The outcome of the second period now depends
on the relative solvency of firms. If both firms are in the same
solvency state at the end of period 1, the outcome is determined by
a Nash game. Then, both firms have the same debt level, which
depends on other capital structure determinants, and have no incen-
tive to change it. But if only one firm is solvent, the outcome is deter-
mined by a Stackelberg game. Through backward induction, Allen
shows that period 0 equilibrium is symmetric (and thus firms play a
Nash game in period 2) below a certain fixed cost of capital t**
whereas the equilibrium is asymmetric (Stackelberg game) above t**.
In period 2, if the firms play the Stackelberg game, the Stackelberg
leader will force the follower out of the market above a fixed cost of
capital t*, with t*∞∞<∞∞t**. At intermediate cost of capacity levels, he
raises capacity above the monopoly level to induce the follower to
liquidate. At high levels, the leader produces the monopoly output,
and the follower’s best response is to liquidate. In sum, when only
one firm is solvent and insolvency leads to a delay in investments,
the fixed cost of capacity determines the outcome of the competitive
game and the marginal costs of bankruptcy. These marginal bank-
ruptcy costs together with tax benefits determine the firm’s debt ratio.
As more debt increases the probability of costly bankruptcy and
liquidation, it is associated with less aggressive output market
behavior. The model also provides evidence for the existence of dif-
ferent debt ratios within the same industry. When firms are asym-
metric, one firm prefers the tax advantage of debt, while the other
firm prefers the advantage of being able to force the rival out of the
market if demand turns out to be low.
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Firms may benefit from taking output market decisions that drive their
rivals into insolvency (strategic bankruptcy effect). A seminal contri-
bution by Telser (1966) introduced the deep-purse argument. Deep-
pocketed incumbents may be able to exhaust financially constrained
firms by engaging in predatory actions such as price wars. Later studies
examine different forms of predation, where predators “jam” infor-
mation in order to put financial constraints on the prey (Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986); Poitevin (1989); Bolton and Scharfstein (1990);
Fernandez-Ruiz (2004)), or to improve their relative performance
(Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990)). Maurer (1999) finds that the pat-
tern of strategic interactions within the industry affects the probability
of predation. Lambrecht (2001) looks at the firm, industry and macro-
economic conditions that influence entry and exit, and the exit order.
Kanatas and Qi (2001) find that differences in maturity and sources
of debt can reduce the predatory threat.
Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1986) signal-jamming model of predation
differs from long-purse predation models in that current profits only
matter insofar they signal future profitability. Under the informational
assumptions that the incumbent’s output prices and fixed costs are not
directly observable, entrants infer future profitability from their cur-
rent earnings and cannot observe predatory activities by the incum-
bent. The incumbent then may have an incentive to abuse this
inference, and “jam” the earnings signal to drive the entrant out of
the market. In the long-purse model, the prey can be forced to exit the
market if it is incapable of renewing capital or financing new pro-
jects.10 In equilibrium, the profits of both firms are reduced, but the
entrant is not fooled as he rationally anticipates the predatory pricing
of the incumbent and only leaves the market if it is unprofitable to
stay. Nevertheless, predation does pay off as it lowers the probability
of entry.
Poitevin (1989) formalizes the deep-pocket model of Telser (1966)
by bypassing the argument that in perfect financial markets, profitable
firms can always secure financing. By endogenizing the entrant’s
financial structure, information asymmetries in financial markets can
increase the entrant’s financial vulnerability. Poitevin develops a
model with an incumbent firm, whose cost structure is known in the
finance community, and an entrant whose cost (higher or lower than
the cost of the incumbent) is uncertain. The entrant needs to make a
753fixed investment, which can only be financed externally. In equi-
librium, the low-cost entrant credibly signals its type to investors by
issuing debt (Proposition 2). By contrast, the high-cost entrant and the
incumbent are entirely equity financed. As debt carries the risk of
bankruptcy, Poitevin shows that the incumbent firm tries to prey upon
the levered entrant by increasing output. The model shows that the
incumbent’s incentives to prey are a function of the entrant’s financial
structure. Predation thus can induce (temporary) exit. Also, if there
are many lemons in the market and predation is strong, signaling costs
may prohibit entry in the market.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) look at how agency problems in
financial contracts can engender rational predation. Making refi-
nancing decisions dependent on firm performance solves incentive
problems between the firm and its financiers, but at the same time
increases the probability that rivals prey upon the firm to lower its
performance and induce exit.
In a two-period model, a deep-pocketed firm competes with a shal-
low-pocketed firm that has to finance its investments in each period
via the capital market. In a world without predation, investors pro-
vide second-period financing if the firm was able to pay back initial
loans, thereby dealing with potential incentive problems. This opti-
mal contract, however, maximizes the rival’s incentives to prey. If pre-
dation is not ruled out, the costs and benefits of predation affect the
optimal financing contract. Two possible solutions are to lower the
probability of refinancing if the firm was solvent in the first period
(shallow pockets), or to increase the probability of refinancing when
the firm was insolvent (deep pockets). If debt contracts are observable
and if deterring predation is more profitable than supporting it,
investors choose for shallow pockets. If contracts are unobservable or
if supporting predation is more profitable, financing contracts are not
adjusted.
While Bolton and Scharfstein look at the difficulty in assessing a
firm’s ex post performance when incumbents have an incentive to
prey, Fernandez-Ruiz (2004) examines the difficulty of determining
the ex ante prospects of a project. To alleviate adverse selection prob-
lems, entrants condition their own survival on future performance
assessments by investors (at the renewal of financing contracts).
Incumbents again have an incentive to distort (“jam”) these assess-
ments by preying upon the entrant. Actual predation depends on the
cost of preying, the difference in profit with or without the entrant
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derives optimal financing contracts in this setting. He finds that the
optimal contract is mostly deep-pocketed, in contrast to the findings
of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), where shallow pockets are optimal
in most cases. The reason is that marginal survival after performance
assessment increases managerial control rents (non-pecuniary bene-
fits), which are not considered by Bolton and Scharfstein. An increase
in marginal survival also increases the project’s ex ante expected
revenues (provided that the firm’s expected cash flows as of date 0 are
worth more than its liquidation value). Finally, Fernandez-Ruiz exam-
ines how the possibility of renegotiating financing contracts after the
assessment affects the optimal ex ante contract. In Propositions 4
and 5, he finds that this possibility has no effect.
Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) show that the prospect of equity
issues can influence output market behavior and that this mechanism
can induce firms to pay out dividends or to repurchase stock. Under
imperfect information, investors try to infer a firm’s costs and demand
from its own and its rivals’realized profits. Rotemberg and Scharfstein
show that a firm’s stock price reacts to its cost position relative to that
of rivals. Managers now can take actions to improve investor percep-
tions of future profits. Rival profits have two countervailing effects on
the firm’s own stock price. First, higher rival profits can be interpreted
as rivals having relatively lower production costs or higher firm-spe-
cific demand (and vice versa). This effect enhances the firm’s aggres-
siveness. Second, high rival profits signal that the industry has low
costs or high demand, which decreases the firm’s aggressiveness.
Depending on which effect dominates, a firm uses its output choice
to influence rival profits and increase its own stock price. In their
model, firms pre-commit to a more or less aggressive output stance by
distributing cash flows as dividends or stock repurchases (equivalent
to changing leverage) depending on the dominant effect. If investors
value relative performance more than industry performance, firms dis-
tribute cash and/or repurchase stock. If investors attach more impor-
tance to industry performance, firms do not pay out cash flows.
Maurer (1999) shows in a two-period model, where one firm
finances projects internally whereas the other (the entrant) has to con-
tract outside debt and where the probability of getting second-period
financing is made contingent on first-period profits, that the tendency
of rivals to prey upon leveraged firms depends inter alia on the pat-
tern of strategic interactions within the industry (Stackelberg or
755simultaneous move). These strategic interactions are modeled by the
observability of the debt contract. If debt contracts are observable
before firms choose their effort levels, the relation between the inter-
nally financed firm and the lender corresponds to a Stackelberg game
between the less levered firm and the investor with the investor acting
as the Stackelberg leader. The optimal contract will deter predation,
but the probability of refinancing is lower compared to the case where
contracts are not observable (Proposition 4). If debt contracts are
not observable, a simultaneous move game results. The unlevered
firm will increase its period 1 effort level (Proposition 3), thereby
increasing the probability that the levered firm will not be refinanced.
Lambrecht (2001) demonstrates the interrelation between firm-spe-
cific, industry-specific and macro-economic factors and their com-
bined effect on entry and exit decisions and on the exit order. Con-
cerning entry, Lambrecht finds in Proposition 9 that an entrant’s need
to borrow money tends to delay entry. An incumbent’s leverage ratio,
however, tends to speed up entry. These two findings support the con-
clusion that higher industry leverage makes competition softer.
Regarding survival, Lambrecht finds that higher operating profits,
lower debt obligations, larger incremental gains from becoming a
monopolist and higher bankruptcy costs (highly intangible assets)11
help firms in their struggle with competitors. The relative importance
of these factors depends on macro-economic variables, such as inter-
est rates, profit volatility and profit growth rates. For the firm-specific
factors, Lambrecht thus extends the empirical findings of Zingales
(1998) that not only the fittest (most efficient), but also the fattest
(lowest coupon) firms survive, to include also the survival of the
greediest firm (the firm with the largest incremental gain of becom-
ing a monopolist). He concludes that in a duopoly, it is more impor-
tant to be fat and greedy than to be fit as firms can benefit substan-
tially from the monopoly outcome. Finally, Lambrecht shows that
macro-economic factors can influence the order in which firms default
if firms differ sufficiently. He finds that increases in profit volatility
are to the relative advantage of the firm with the lower profit and
higher coupon parameters, whereas increases in profit growth and
interest rates are to the relative advantage of the firm with the higher
profit and the lower coupon parameters.
Kanatas and Qi (2001) recognize the incentives of rivals to distort
information to investors. Also, they take into account that investors
may recognize the incentives of rivals to dilute a firm’s information
756stream. In a Cournot duopoly model, they examine the different
information effects of short-term versus long-term debt, and bank
versus capital market debt. With short-term debt, firms have to refi-
nance early, which requires a certain degree of transparency. When
making refinancing decisions, investors compare the performance of
the firm relative to that of its rival. Thus, both the firm and its rival
have an incentive to distort the information to their advantage when
debt contracts are short-term. As the authors assume that banks moni-
tor their loans, bank lending also induces information distortion.
Long-term and capital market debt, by contrast, reduce this incentive
but increase the managers’ abilities to shirk and invest in negative
NPV projects. Kanatas and Qi show that firms will sooner try to prey
when competitors are financed with short-term or bank debt. Con-
sistent with Glazer (1994), short-term debt and bank debt stimulate
firms to act more aggressively in the output market, but do not
moderate managers’ information distortion incentives. Also, they
show that short-term debt usage decreases in industry concentration
whereas the use of long-term increases as price elasticity of demand
increases.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Over the last decade, attention has shifted away from theoretical to
empirical work on the interactions between capital structure and
product markets. The main point of interest in this empirical literature
is the question whether firms interact strategically through limited lia-
bility, strategic investment, strategic bankruptcy and/or predation?
And how do firm and rival debt ratios affect these interactions? Rela-
tively little attention has gone to the impact of NFS on the financing
choices of a firm, largely because of a lack of data.
We structured this section conform our discussion of the theoreti-
cal models; this process was not easy as empirical papers tend to test
a bulk of theories at once. We have chosen to discuss each paper
entirely within one category – its dominant category – instead of
slicing up the results. Mostly, the results are in line with the theoreti-
cal predictions and other empirical studies. Nevertheless, we also treat
empirical evidence that disagrees with the above-discussed theoreti-
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What are the determinants of capital
structure choice? Are the effects consis-
tent for different measures of leverage?
What are the determinants of financial
structure of start-ups? Are the effects
similar for established firms? Is there a
relation between leverage, debt mix, and
maturity choices?
Do capital structure determinants pro-
posed in the literature explain active
debt and equity issues, or do only stock
prices explain leverage dynamics? Do
firms readjust to their target debt ratios?
Firms with unique/specialized product-
shave lower debt ratios. Transaction costs
are more important for (small) firms than
other determinants. Debt ratios are not
related to the firm’s expected growth,
volatility of operating income, non-debt
tax shields or asset collateral value.
Decisions concerning level and composi-
tion of debt are made simultaneously and
financing decisions are context-specific.
Adverse selection and moral hazard
affect relations with creditors. Private
benefits of control, owner type and scale
economies affect financing choices.
Stock price effects are more important
than other capital structure determinants
in explaining debt ratios. Firms with
more profitable assets and highly volatile
returns avoid readjustment to their debt
ratios after equity offerings.
469 (large) firms from Compustat
Industrial Files; 1974-1982
244 Belgian start-ups in manufac-
turing in 1992 and their four-digit
NACE incumbents
>40,000 firm-years from Compu-
stat and CRSP; 1962-20007
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What is the effect of financial distress
on firm performance? What is the role
of switching costs and industry concen-
tration?
High-debt firms loose market share and
firm value, sales decline during industry
downturns. This loss is higher in more
concentrated industries with differenti-
ated products.
46,799 firm-years (U.S.); 3% in
distressed industries; 1972-1991
How do NFS affect capital structure?
How does capital structure interact with
market structure? How does it enact
strategic behavior by the firm and its
rivals?
How are debt ratios related to cost and
demand parameters?
How does market structure affect debt
ratios?
Employee bargaining power, customer
concentration, reputation and economic
growth are negatively related whereas
industry concentration and vertical indus-
try concentration and vertical integration
are positively related to leverage.
Demand uncertainty is positively whereas
cost uncertainty is negatively related to
leverage.
Oligopolies have higher leverage than
monopolies. The relation between con-
centration and leverage is U-shaped.
The prices of oligopolists are positively
related to debt ratios.
1,502 Spanish manufacturin firms;
1993-1999
1,641 U.S. manufacturing firms;
1975-1994
22 newspaper companies; 1957-
19957
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Is debt a mechanism that reduces over-
investment in industries where high con-
centration reduces the disciplinary effect
of product market competition? Limited
liability effect? Strategic investment
effect?
What dynamic effects do financing deci-
sions have on investment decisions and
output market competition over the busi-
ness cycle? What effect do a firm’s
liquidation value, customer switching
costs and rival financial structure have?
Does recapitalization restrict empire
building? Does predation occur when
rivals are less levered? Does higher
leverage induce stronger competition?
Firms are more likely to recapitalize
when they have plants of low productiv-
ity, when they operate in a highly con-
centrated industry, and when industry
capacity utilization is low. Afterwards,
firms produce less but rivals increase
their output.
With negative demand shocks, high-lev-
ered firms loose market share. This effect
is exacerbated if competitors have low
debt levels or if customers face high
switching costs.
Leverage decreases market share and
sales and increases plant closings, prices
and operating margins, except when the
industry has low entry barriers.
867 firms from ten commodity
industries; 1979-1990
1,744 U.S. manufacturing firms
in 57 industries; 1989-1991 and
firm-level panel data; 1976-1996
4 U.S. industries (Compustat);
1980-1990
What is the impact of rival leverage on
the relation between capital structure
and pricing decisions? Predation?
Post-LBO, the firm’s price is higher than
that of less levered rivals. If rivals are
highly levered, prices rise whereas prices
fall if rivals have low leverage.
U.S. supermarket chains; firm-













Do liquidity constrained industries raise
mark-ups and cut capital expenditures
and inventories during cyclical down-
turns? Are mark-ups more countercycli-
cal in more concentrated industries?
Is a firm’s mark-up more countercyclical
if it is more financially constrained?
What is the effect of rival financial con-
straints? Are average industry mark-ups
more countercyclical if firms are more
financially constrained?
Does debt, conditional on the phase of
the business cycle and rival leverage,
lead to underperformance as high lever-
age firms cut investments in market
share? When are mark-ups counter-
cyclical?
Mark-ups tend to be more countercycli-
cal in highly concentrated industries that
have a greater fraction of liquidity con-
strained firms. Investments in PPE are
procyclical.
Liquidity constraints make firm mark-ups
countercyclical. During recessions, prices
rise more in MSAwith a lot of financially
constrained supermarket chains. Finally,
firms tend to raise their prices more when
their rivals are highly levered.
During (demand) busts, highly levered
firms loose markets share in relatively
unlevered industries. Those losses are
reversed during booms. In high-debt
industries, these competitive dynamics
are not observed. Mark-ups are more
countercyclical if industry debt is high.
20 (two-digit SC) manufacturing
industries; 1959-1989
U.S. supermarket chains (firm and
industry data); 1986-1992
28,133 firm-quarters in 171 indus-
tries; firm- and industry-level data
(Compustat); 1976-19967
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Does debt play a fundamentally different
role in firms, depending on the amount
of positive NPV projects? Does the pre-
sence of growth opportunities affect the
relation between equity ownership and
corporate value?
Firm value (Tobin’s Q) is negatively
related to leverage for firms with a lot of
profitable investment opportunities and
vice versa for low-growth firms. The
relation between corporate value and
insider equity ownership is quadratic.
Institutional and block ownership is posi-
tively related to Q for low-growth firms.
These relations are less clear-cut for
high-growth firms.
1,764 U.S. firms in 1976, 1986,
1988; Compustat, Value Line
investment survey
What is the effect of leverage on the
bidding behavior of firms, controlling
i.a. for bankruptcy risk?
Does financial distress and bankruptcy
affect pricing behavior?
As debt levels increase, firms tend to
reduce their bids. Higher rival debt ratios
also induce firms to lower their bids. The
probability of winning the bid is nega-
tively related to firm and rival leverage,
even though the coefficient of the latter
variable is not significant.
Airline companies threatened by bank-
ruptcy reduce their prices to reflect the
drop in customer demand. The prices of
rival companies do not respond.
14 companies, 150 company-bid
pairs (FCC, Compustat, Warga
Lehman Brothers); Dec. 1994-
March 1995
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Do sharp debt increases interact with
market structure to influence plant clo-
sing and investment decisions of firms
and their rivals?
Recapitalizing firms in highly concen-
trated industries are more likely to close
plants and invest less. Rival firms are
less likely to close and invest more when
the recapitalizing firm has a high market
share. Plant-level productivity and indus-
try capacity utilization are even more
important than capital structure to
explain investment and plant closing
decisions.
firm-level data from 10 commo-
dity industries in which at least
one of the top-4 recapitalizes;
1979-1990
Do share prices respond to the announ-
cement of rival chain LBOs? Entry?
Exit? Expansion? How do (non-)com-
petitors respond in the output market?
How does leverage affect a firm’s ability
to respond to unexpected changes in the
competitive environment? What are the
sources of these effects?
Leverage increases (through LBOs) lead
to softer product market competition.
Competitors enter and expand in markets
dominated by LBO firms and their share
prices respond positively to an LBO
announcement.
Highly levered firms in limited competi-
tive markets are less likely to survive.
High debt curtails investments and redu-
ces the price in limited competitive mar-
kets.
U.S. supermarket chains; 4 LBO
firms and 13 rivals from 85 MSA;
1985-1991
941 firms, U.S. trucking industry;
1977-19857
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and Van de 
Gucht, 2004
What are the firm and market characte-
ristics that affect incumbents’ responses
to entry?
Is competition positively related to the
exit probability of start-ups? Are highly
levered start-ups less likely to survive
under competitive pressure? Does finan-
cial market predation exist?
Larger, more profitable LBO firms res-
pond more aggressively to entry whereas
highly levered incumbents that did not
undergo an LBO respond less aggressi-
vely. In markets with no entry, high-debt
firms compete more aggressive than low-
debt firms.
Highly levered start-ups are more likely
to exit, but only in the case of strategic
complements and when adverse selection
and moral hazard problems in financial
markets are more likely.
69 discount store chains in 862
local markets (Compustat); 1975-
1996
235 Belgian start-ups in manu-
facturing in 1992 and their four-
digit NACE rivalsA. NFS determinants of capital structure
The first central paper discussed in this section is Titman and Wessels
(1988). Their findings will be compared to those of Huyghebaert and
Van de Gucht (2002), Welch (2004) and Istaitieh and Rodriguez
(2003). Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht examine the determinants of
financial structure for start-up firms, Welch investigates how capital
markets steer the relation between determinants and financial structure
and Istaitieh and Rodriguez approach capital structure from a stake-
holders’ point of view. Finally, Showalter (1999) and Schargrodsky
(2002) provide evidence that market structure affects capital structure.
Titman and Wessels (1988) use a covariance structure model to esti-
mate the impact of theoretical capital structure determinants on
leverage. Such a covariance structure model consists of a structural
model, which specifies the relations between constructs (the capital
structure determinants) and leverage, and a measurement model, which
develops the relations between constructs and their proxy variables.
As theory uses different (non-trivial) definitions of leverage, Titman
and Wessels separate leverage into the ratios of short-term, long-term
and convertible debt to equity, where equity is measured both in
market and book values.
Titman and Wessels use a sample of 469 large firms, selected from
the Compustat Industrial Files between 1974-1982. The main results
are that firms with unique or specialized products have relatively low
debt ratios, which supports Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Tit-
man (1991).12 Uniqueness is measured by three variables, namely:
R&D/sales, selling expenses/sales, and job quit rates. Smaller firms
use significantly more short-term debt than larger firms, which,
together with the negative relation between past profitability and cur-
rent leverage, indicate that transaction costs may be an important
determinant of capital structure. Titman and Wessels find no evidence
that debt ratios are related to a firm’s expected growth, volatility of
operating income, non-debt tax shields or asset collateral value. Also,
the variation in convertible debt ratios across firms remains largely
unexplained.
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2002) examine how capital struc-
ture determinants survive in a sample of business start-ups. These
firms are characterized by a lack of (financial and operating) history,
which enlarges information asymmetries. Start-ups also have little repu-
tation at stake, which together with a high ownership concentration
765increase agency problems of debt. Finally, start-ups face relatively
high exit rates. The paper’s hypotheses are constructed starting from
the firm’s stakeholders. The supply-side is represented by banks and
other creditors (suppliers and lessors), the demand-side by the entre-
preneur. Supply-side problems include adverse selection and moral
hazard (risk shifting and underinvestment incentives). Demand-side
concerns mainly consider entrepreneurial control rights.
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht simultaneously investigate three
components of financial structure: the debt ratio, debt mix and matu-
rity structure. Their sample consists of 244 Belgian manufacturing
start-ups in 1992. The empirical results show that when the proba-
bility of adverse selection and moral hazard problems is high, start-up
firms contract less bank debt. Banks do not limit loan maturity to curb
these problems, however. The lower share of bank credit is compen-
sated by an increase in leasing and trade credit. Overall, credit from
non-bank sources cannot fully offset the lower bank debt. Finally, con-
sistent with Myers (1977), start-ups in industries with substantial
growth opportunities raise significantly less debt, but have a larger
fraction of bank debt. As a number of these effects differ from the
relations found for mature firms, the authors state that financing deci-
sions are context-specific.13 From the demand-side point of view,
entrepreneurs who value private control benefits limit bank debt
and resort to trade credit and leasing. They also prefer to lengthen
the maturity of their bank debt. Other interesting results are that high-
quality entrepreneurs prefer short-term bank debt, and start-ups
operating in industries with large scale economies raise significantly
more debt.
Welch (2004) investigates whether the theoretical determinants of
capital structure and/or stock prices explain active debt and equity
issues. If the theoretical determinants are relevant, firms should re-
adjust to their target debt ratios whenever the deviation costs are larger
than the issue costs. If stock prices are important, no counterbalanc-
ing security transactions should be undertaken. Welch uses Compustat
and CRSP data on more than 40,000 (large) firm-years during the
period 1962-2000 to estimate the following equation:
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766where the LHS measures the change in the actual debt ratio over a
one- or five-year horizon, and the RHS gives the sum of a constant,
return-induced debt ratio changes, and determinants put forward by the
literature along with interaction terms between these determinants and
return-induced debt ratio changes.
Welch finds that 40% of capital structure dynamics can be explained
by stock prices. Also, he finds that although firms are issuing enough
securities to enable them to return to their target debt ratios after a
stock return induced equity growth, firms do not neutralize stock price
induced deviations from target ratios. Overall, stock price effects are
considerably more important in explaining debt ratios than theoretical
capital structure determinants.14 Although previous studies (e.g.,
Titman and Wessels, 1988) found that these variables correlate with
debt ratios, Welch argues this was only an indirect effect because of
the correlation of these determinants with (omitted) stock returns. Vari-
ables that remain significant after adding stock price effects are the
move towards industry debt ratios and the increase in leverage for
firms that engaged in M&A activities. Furthermore, firms with more
profitable assets and highly volatile returns tend to avoid re-adjust-
ments after equity offerings.
The study of Istaitieh and Rodriguez (2003) is the first to explicitly
test stakeholder theory. They empirically examine interaction terms
between theoretical capital structure determinants and input/output
market variables using panel data on 1,502 Spanish manufacturing
firms in the 1993-1999 period. Istaitieh and Rodriguez use a system
of simultaneous equations to solve the inherent endogeneity problem
when foresighted firms anticipate the output market consequences of
their financing decisions.
The system contains two equations: a financial leverage equation
and a product market concentration equation. Their main empirical
findings regarding product market determinants of capital structure
are that employee bargaining power (proxied by labor expenses minus
dismissal and early retirement indemnities over value added) and cus-
tomer bargaining power (proxied by customer concentration) are
negatively related to leverage. These relations support Sarig’s (1998)
argument that lower leverage increases the firm’s negotiation power
when dealing with strong NFS.15 Firms with larger capital investment
spending have higher debt ratios, which rejects the underinvestment
argument of Myers (1977). Also industry concentration and vertical
integration are positively related to leverage, whereas reputation
767(measured by the firm’s age) and economic growth are negatively
related to debt ratios.
Showalter (1999) examines how debt ratios are related to demand
and cost parameters. Using a sample of 1,641 U.S. manufacturing
firms that are followed over the period 1975-1994, he regresses their
debt ratio on a set of capital structure determinants and variables mea-
suring demand and cost uncertainty (calculated as the log of the stan-
dard error of linear and non-linear sales trend regressions, respectively
cost trend regressions). Showalter finds that the coefficient of the
demand uncertainty variable is significantly positively whereas that
of the cost uncertainty variable is significantly negatively related to the
debt ratio, from which he concludes that most firms compete in prices.
Consistent with Showalter (1995), debt levels are adjusted when
uncertainty increases, which supports the existence of strategic debt.
Schargrodsky (2002) argues that while a lot of empirical studies
have examined the relation between leverage and (price) competition,
there is still no strong evidence on how market structure affects debt
ratios. He studies both relations on a sample of 22 newspaper com-
panies between 1957 and 1995 as this industry has a wide variability
in market structure across local markets and across time (i.e. both
monopoly and oligopoly structures are present). After controlling for
a wide range of capital structure determinants, Schargrodsky finds
that oligopolies have higher debt ratios than monopolies. This finding
is consistent with the existence of strategic debt as monopolists
and firms operating under perfect competition have no incentive to
raise their debt for strategic reasons. Graphically, Schargrodsky finds
the relation between concentration and leverage to be U-shaped.
Finally, he finds that the prices of monopolists are not affected by
debt ratios whereas the prices of oligopolists are significantly posi-
tively related to debt ratios. These findings support the models of
Showalter (1995) and Dasgupta and Titman (1998) that leverage can
be used to sustain collusive equilibria in market structures where firms
compete in prices.
Overall, the above papers show that a lot of uncertainty remains as
to which factors truly determine capital structure and that strategic
uses of debt should be considered. As the results of Huyghebaert and
Van de Gucht (2002) show, researchers also have to reflect on the con-
ditions under which the results found in more general papers, like Tit-
man and Wessels (1988) and Welch (2004), are likely to hold in other
samples.
768B. Impact of capital structure on product market decisions
Mid-1990s, researchers started to focus on the strategic implications
of capital structure. Specifically, they examined how exogenous shifts
in leverage (through recapitalizations and LBOs) and exogenous out-
put market shocks affect product market behavior and rival firms’
financing decisions. In this section, we start by discussing the models
examining production, pricing and investment decisions and end by
discussing predatory models of entry and exit.
1. Production decisions
Opler and Titman (1994) show that during industry downturns, highly
levered firms loose market share and that this effect is exacerbated
by product differentiation and industry concentration. Kovenock
and Phillips (1995) find that recapitalizing firms become less aggres-
sive whereas rivals become more aggressive. Campello and Fluck
(2004) conclude that when demand decreases, especially highly
levered firms loose market share. Also, this loss is larger for firms
whose products involve large consumer switching costs. Finally,
Phillips (1995) finds that leverage decreases market share and sales
and increases prices and operating margins, except for industries with
low entry barriers.
Opler and Titman (1994) investigate under which conditions finan-
cial distress costs affect firm performance on a sample of 46,799 firm-
years between 1972 and 1991, of which roughly 3% were in distressed
industries.16 They find that relatively highly levered publicly traded
firms loose market share and firm value during industry downturns.
They also show that this effect is more pronounced when firms pro-
duce differentiated goods (as measured by their R&D expenditures)
and in highly concentrated industries (four-firm concentration ratio),
which is consistent with Titman (1984), respectively predation models.
Size has no clear effect on this relation. Next, they examine the impact
of an exogenous industry downturn on firm performance (industry-
adjusted sales growth, stock prices and operating income growth).
If high debt would be beneficial and financial distress costs would be
low, highly levered firms should perform relatively better. However,
Opler and Titman find the opposite effect. These findings are in line
with Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) in that NFS
price expected bankruptcy costs, which are higher for firms with
769specialized goods and which increase faster for highly indebted firms
during downturns.
Kovenock and Phillips (1995) show that debt plays an important
role in highly concentrated industries. They look at ten commodity
industries over the period 1979-1990 in which 40 firms discretely
increased their debt. In these industries, agency costs of equity are not
significantly reduced by product market competition.17 The paper
shows that firms with low-productivity plants in highly concentrated
industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase their debt financ-
ing. This finding can be interpreted as reflecting the disciplining effect
of debt in markets that are not disciplined by output market competi-
tion (Jensen (1986)). Kovenock and Phillips introduce another expla-
nation for their results, the strategic investment effect of debt. Con-
sistent with Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory, it states that debt
payments constrain the amount of (cheap) internal funds, and thus
investments need to be externally financed to a larger extent. As exter-
nal financing is more expensive than internal funding, the slope of the
price reaction curve (under Bertrand competition) becomes steeper at
the level of output where internal funds are exhausted. From that point
onwards, price responses are higher and firms compete less aggres-
sively. Firms can thus pre-commit to a less aggressive policy by con-
tracting debt. The model shows that after increasing its debt level, the
firm produces less, but its rival increases output and both firms have
higher profits. These model predictions seem to fit with the data.18
Campello and Fluck (2004) show that within an industry, following
a negative shock to demand, more levered firms suffer larger losses
in market share. They use two data sets on U.S. manufacturing firms
and the industries in which they compete. A first one examines the
effects of the exogenous 1990-1991 recession. Secondly, they use
(quarterly) firm-level panel data between 1976 and 1996. Interestingly,
the decline in market share is even more pronounced when competitors
have only limited amounts of debt outstanding. Consumer-switching
costs, however, aggravate this decline in market share during
recessions as durability (measured by two-digit SIC industry dum-
mies, labeled ‘durable’ by either the Bureau of Census, respectively
Sharpe (1994))19 and sales growth are negatively related across low-
and high-debt industries. Overall, when demand is uncertain, leverage
makes firms behave less aggressively, which is consistent with the
predictions of Showalter (1995) and Wanzenried (2003) under price
competition.
770Phillips (1995) meticulously selected four industries (fiberglass
roofing and insulation, tractor trailer, polyethylene chemicals, and
gypsum) to investigate the effects of exogenous capital structure
changes on a firm’s production and pricing decisions over the period
1980-1990. The selection of the industries is based on four criteria: the
firm with the largest sales in the industry should have increased its
debt-to-market value ratio by more than 25%, this leading firm should
produce at least 50% of its output in that industry and there should be
homogeneous products and imperfect competition in the industry.
Summary statistics show that leveraged recapitalizations are followed
by decreases in market share for the firm undergoing the recapi-
talization, except for the gypsum industry. Also, plant closings occur
at a much higher rate. Next, Phillips examines the impact of a recapi-
talization on volumes and various performance measures at the indus-
try level. He finds, except for the gypsum industry, decreasing output
and sales and increasing operating margins. For two industries (i.e.
fiberglass and tractor trailer), he also finds decreases in capital expen-
ditures.
Next, he uses the multivariate framework of Bresnahan (1989) to
examine quantity and price movements, controlling for changes in
input prices and the level of production. Phillips also introduces a
capital structure variable to measure the effect of debt on pricing
decisions.20 A product demand function and a marginal cost function
are simultaneously estimated using a two-stage instrumental variables
technique. The final form of both equations is:
qt∞ = a0∞∞+∞∞a1pt∞∞+∞∞a2yt∞∞+∞∞a3rt∞∞+∞∞et
pt = b0∞∞+∞∞b1qt∞∞+∞∞bj∞wt∞∞+∞∞g∞*∞(Debtratiot)∞∞+∞∞vt
In all four industries, the capital structure variable turns out to be sig-
nificant. The average industry debt ratio is significantly positively
related to prices, except for the gypsum industry where the relation is
negative. Phillips attributes this negative sign for the gypsum indus-
try to the low entry barriers and the ease of expansion in this indus-
try, and to the fact that the third and fourth largest firms in this indus-
try had low leverage and gained market share following the firm’s
recapitalization. Overall, he positions his findings in the literature that
associates debt increases with reductions in agency costs of equity
(Jensen (1986)).21 The results for the (low entry barriers) gypsum
industry are placed within the Brander and Lewis (1986) framework,
where debt induces firms to choose more aggressive output strategies.
7712. Pricing strategies
In this section, we discuss studies that investigate how capital struc-
ture affects pricing decisions. Chevalier (1995a) finds that the price
reactions to discrete capital structure changes (LBOs) are influenced
by rival debt ratios. Chevalier and Scharfstein ((1995), (1996)) and
Campello (2003) examine how leverage and concentration interact to
affect (the cyclicality of) mark-ups. Chevalier and Scharfstein ((1995),
(1996)) find that liquidity constraints make mark-ups more counter-
cyclical at the industry, respectively firm level, especially if the mar-
ket is highly concentrated. Campello (2003) finds that the counter-
cyclicality of mark-ups depends on rival debt ratios. Clayton and
Ravid (2002) show that high firm and rival debt reduces bids in auc-
tions. Finally, Borenstein and Rose (1995) find that airline companies
change their pricing behavior when faced with financial distress to
take into account a drop in customer demand.
Chevalier (1995a) examines the impact of discrete capital structure
changes on pricing decisions. For this purpose, she investigates LBOs
in the supermarket industry. She has operational, financial and owner-
ship data on supermarket chains in 85 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
between 1985 and 1991. Next, she has a database with price data at
the MSA and firm level. Chevalier regresses price changes the quar-
ter before the LBO occurred until six quarters afterwards on variables
that measure the extent to which price changes by the LBO firm
should be accommodated by its rivals (size of the LBO firm and its
(biggest) rivals) and some control variables. She finds that an LBO
firm increases its prices if rivals are highly levered, but that prices
decrease if a single lowly levered (large) competitor is present in the
market. Chevalier compares the LBO results with those of the same
regression that examines the six quarters before the LBO occurred.
The relation between price changes and rival leverage is not significant
before the LBO, which supports the conclusion that price dynamics
around the LBO are truly engendered by the LBO. The argument that
a common shock affects prices is refuted by the fact that price effects
are opposite in different markets. Finally, Chevalier also finds that the
prices of LBO firms are significantly higher than the prices of less
levered firms, providing evidence that LBOs create incentives to raise
prices.
The theoretical concepts behind the results are built around the price
effects of an LBO. On the one hand, Chevalier looks at agency theory
772and liquidity constraints to explain increasing prices following an
LBO. The agency hypothesis of empire building predicts that
managers may engage in value-decreasing price wars as an invest-
ment in future market share. From this perspective, an LBO aligns the
incentives of managers and owners, thereby inducing higher post-LBO
prices. Because of debt servicing, an LBO also constrains the firm’s
free cash flows, which may reduce investments in market share. As a
result, firms may charge higher prices following their LBO. On the
other hand, Chevalier looks at predation models to explain price
decreases by LBO firms in industries where rivals are not highly
levered. As an LBO usually is followed by a restructuring, whereby
low-performing units are divested, rivals have an incentive to signal
to the (new) owners that the LBO firm is a low-performer. They can
do this by cutting prices, which the LBO firm has to follow in order
to stay competitive.
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995) investigate whether credit con-
strained industries have countercyclical mark-ups, controlling for
industry concentration. When capital market imperfections make it
difficult to raise external financing, firms are forced to cut investments
during recessions, when less internal funds are generated. In a switch-
ing cost model, firms invest in market share by keeping prices low.22
Thus, just as firms cut investments in PPE and inventories when cash-
constrained, they will cut investments in market share during reces-
sions by raising mark-ups. During economic booms, when current
demand is high relative to future demand, firms are more likely to
decrease prices to capture the high demand.
Chevalier and Scharfstein simultaneously estimate three equations
using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. They have a
sample of 20 two-digit SIC manufacturing industries between 1959
and 1989. Their first regression looks at the effect of liquidity con-
straints, proxied by the percentage of small firms in the industry, and
the four-firm concentration ratio on mark-up cyclicality. Mark-up
cyclicality is hereby defined as the correlation coefficient between log
detrended industry mark-up23 and log detrended GNP. The second and
the third regression look at the effect of liquidity constraints on capi-
tal expenditure cyclicality, respectively inventory cyclicality.24 The
first regression confirms that mark-ups are countercyclical as they find
a significantly negative effect of liquidity constraints on mark-up
cyclicality. The significantly negative effect of industry concentration
on mark-up cyclicality shows that mark-ups are more countercyclical
773in highly concentrated industries. The positive and significant effect
of the percentage of small firms on the cyclicality of capital expendi-
tures shows that investments are procyclical. Concerning inventory
cyclicality, no significant results are found although signs are as
expected.
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) look at how liquidity constraints
due to capital market imperfections affect a firm’s pricing behavior
during economic booms and recessions. They work out a theoretical
model where two firms compete during two periods in a market with
switching costs. Without external financing needs, mark-ups tend to
rise during booms because the increase in current demand makes it
less attractive to price low to increase future market share. So, mark-
ups are pro-cyclical. After introducing capital market imperfections,
this result reverses as firms are less inclined to invest in market share
during recessions, implying countercyclical mark-ups. The reason is
that the increase in the probability of liquidation makes it less likely
that the firm can take full advantage of its locked-in customers.
Their empirical study is conducted on a dataset of U.S. supermar-
kets. They look at the effect of exogeneous liquidity shocks to cir-
cumvent the endogeneity problem between prices and liquidity. Focus-
ing on the supermarket industry has the advantage that shocks to
marginal cost are similar for all supermarkets operating in the same
local market (MSA), and that a study on price changes gives compa-
rable results to a study on changes in price-cost margins.25 First,
Chevalier and Scharfstein regress price changes on the market share
of national supermarkets active in the local market, a dummy vari-
able that indicates whether state earnings accounted for by oil and gas
are larger than 2%, an interaction term between both variables and
some control variables. They find that in oil-dependent states, prices
fall more when national chains are largely present. Local supermar-
kets, whose liquidity is more heavily affected by the local recession
than that of national (diversified) supermarkets, decrease prices to a
lesser extent during recessions, as implied by their theoretical model.
Second, the authors look at the effects of LBOs on pricing behavior
during the economic bust at the beginning of the 90’s. As LBO firms
are more highly levered than their rivals, they are expected to boost
short-run cash flows during busts to meet their debt servicing pay-
ments. Here, the regression shows that an interaction term between the
share of local stores owned by LBO firms and the change in employ-
ment is significantly negatively related to price changes. This result
774shows that during downturns, prices tend to rise more in markets with
a lot of LBO firms than in markets with less liquidity constrained
firms. Finally, by combining firm- and market-level data, Chevalier
and Scharfstein test whether prices are more countercyclical if the
firm, respectively its rivals are more liquidity constrained. Overall,
the regression shows that LBO firms tend to raise prices more than
non-LBO firms; they do even more so in local markets with bad eco-
nomic conditions. This result is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) argu-
ment that increased debt reduces managers’ incentives to invest in
value-decreasing empire building projects. They also find that firms
tend to raise prices more when their rivals are highly levered; this
relation is even stronger when supermarkets are competing in a local
market with slow economic growth.
Campello (2003) shows that conditional on the phase of the busi-
ness cycle and rival debt ratios, leverage can influence a firm’s product
market behavior. He looks at the sensitivity and the differences
in sensitivity of sales growth and mark-ups to leverage following
shocks to aggregate demand. More specifically, Campello looks at
differences in responses of the sales growth-leverage, respectively
mark-up-leverage sensitivity to macro-economic shocks across low-
and high-debt industries. Campello uses firm- and industry-level data
from Compustat. His dataset contains information on 128,133 firm-
quarters of firms in 71 industries between 1976 and 1996. In a two-
stage regression model, he first estimates the sensitivity of relative-
to-industry sales growth to relative-to-industry leverage. Then, he
examines how the worsening of economic conditions affects this
parameter. The same approach is used for calculating the sensitivity
of mark-ups to leverage.
Campello shows that when industry debt is high, mark-ups become
more countercyclical. These results confirm those of Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1996), who find that the degree of firm mark-up cycli-
cality depends both on the firm’s own financial constraints as well as
on the financial status of rivals. Next, when rivals are relatively
unlevered, firm leverage has a negative impact on relative-to-industry
sales growth during recessions, but a positive influence during booms.
When rivals are relatively levered, no such effects are found. These
results are in line with Telser’s (1966) long-purse argument that highly
levered firms in lowly levered industries are forced out of the market
during recessions. In these downturns, it is also difficult to renegoti-
ate debt contracts as credit is tight, which makes predation more likely.
775No evidence is found for the limited liability model of Brander and
Lewis (1986).
Clayton and Ravid (2002) investigate the link between capital struc-
ture and product market behavior in the context of firms’ bidding
behavior for FCC spectrum auctions (a multiple-round auction for
broadband airwaves). The paper combines data from FCC spectrum
auctions (between December 1994 and March 1995) with financial
data from Compustat and data on the market value of debt from Warga
Lehman Brothers’fixed income database. Clayton and Ravid have full
information on 14 large companies involved in 150 company-bid pairs.
Clayton and Ravid perform two major empirical tests. First, they
regress the highest bid of a firm on the firm’s leverage, the weighted
average debt ratio of competitors, some proxies for the firm’s bank-
ruptcy risk (interest coverage ratio, Altman’s Z-score and bond
ratings),26 interaction terms between firm leverage and these proxies
and a set of control variables. They find that when leverage increases,
firms tend to lower their bids and thus behave less competitively. Fur-
thermore, if competitors have higher debt ratios, firms tend to reduce
their bid even more. Although the effect of leverage on competition
is opposite to what Brander and Lewis (1986) predict, this result is
consistent with Showalter (1995) as competition here is in prices rather
than quantities. The interest coverage ratio is the only significant bank-
ruptcy proxy, but with an unexpected negative sign. So, the higher the
bankruptcy threat, the higher the company’s highest bid. The interac-
tion terms are not significant. The second empirical test, which models
the probability of winning the bid, largely confirms the results already
found. This probability is negatively related to firm leverage and
(insignificantly) negatively related to competitor leverage. Now, the
bankruptcy proxies have the expected negative sign, except for the
interest coverage ratio, which is insignificant in this regression.27
So, firms with a larger probability of going bankrupt have a lower
probability of winning the bid.
Borenstein and Rose (1995) look into the much-debated pricing
strategy of firms filing for bankruptcy using data from the airline
industry. From a sample of 1,777 airline routes offered by firms that
file for (Chapter 11) bankruptcy between 1987-1993, they find evi-
dence that airlines threatened by bankruptcy reduce their prices by
5,6% in the period of 6 to 3 months before they eventually file. How-
ever, in the 3 months before and the 6 months after filing, airlines do
not cut prices. Also, rival prices do not seem to respond heavily to the
776filing. Borenstein and Rose conclude that the price cuts may be ratio-
nal in that they represent a drop in customer demand following cus-
tomers’lower perceived quality of financially distressed airlines. All in
all, they find little evidence that bankruptcy itself affects an airline’s
pricing behavior.
3. Investments
McConnell and Servaes (1995) look at how corporate value (mea-
sured by Tobin’s Q) is affected by leverage and equity ownership
structure (corporate insiders, institutional and block ownership) on a
sample of 1,764 U.S. listed firms in 1976, 1986 or 1988. They split
up their sample into high- and low-growth firms (using their P/E ratio,
Value Line’s sales growth forecast or five-year historical sales growth)
and perform regressions of Q on leverage, ownership and some con-
trol variables. In line with the theoretical predictions of Hart and
Moore (1995), they find that for high-growth firms, Q is significantly
negatively related to leverage and vice versa for low-growth firms.
The relation between ownership structure and corporate value is less
clear-cut. First, the relation between inside ownership and corporate
value is curvilinear: the simple term is significantly positive whereas
the quadratic term in inside ownership is significantly negatively
related to corporate value in most regressions. Second, institutional
ownership is always significantly positively related to Q for low-
growth firms (supporting the efficient monitoring hypothesis), and
almost always positive for high-growth firms. Finally, block owner-
ship is always positively (but not always significantly so) related to
Q for low-growth firms, but not for high-growth firms.
Kovenock and Phillips (1997) examine how capital structure and
product market characteristics interact to affect plant exit and invest-
ment decisions in an environment where firms increased their leverage
through LBOs or recapitalizations. Their study is executed at the
firm level using data from ten industries over the period 1979-1990.
The industry selection is based on three criteria: one of the top-four
firms in the industry increased leverage by more than 25%, the indus-
try produces commodity goods and is in manufacturing. The depen-
dent variables are plant closing (dummy = 1 if the firm closes a plant
in a particular year), respectively investment decisions (capital expen-
ditures/beginning period assets, respectively dummy = 1 if the firm
invests >5% of year-end assets). Independent variables are from three
777classes: capital structure variables, plant efficiency variables and vari-
ables capturing market structure, demand and demand changes.
The results show that although debt does not affect exit and invest-
ments directly, it plays an important role when interacted with con-
centration measures. Recapitalizing firms in highly concentrated
industries are more likely to close down plants and invest less. Rivals
are less likely to shut down plants and invest more when the leveraged
firm has a high market share. So, Kovenock and Phillips find that
increasing leverage is consistent with more passive investment
behavior by the recapitalizing firm and more aggressive behavior by
rival firms. The first observation is in line with models that find anti-
competitive effects of debt (e.g., Showalter (1995); Spagnolo (2000);
Faure-Grimaud (2000)). The increase in rival aggressiveness can be
linked to predation models. Another important result is that plant-level
productivity and industry capacity utilization are highly significant
variables in explaining investment and plant closing decisions, even
more important than capital structure. The results further show that
industry concentration, capacity utilization, and relative plant pro-
ductivity are significant determinants of recapitalization decisions.
Indeed, by using lagged values of these variables, the paper shows
that capital structure changes are a response to longer-run changes in
industry demand and supply conditions.
4. Predation, entry and exit
In a lot of empirical contributions discussed so far (e.g., Chevalier
(1995a); Phillips (1995); Kovenock and Phillips (1997); Campello
(2003)), part of the results can be placed within the framework of pre-
dation. In this section, papers focus on entry and exit decisions and
their relation to capital structure and market characteristics. Chevalier
(1995b) concludes that rivals find entry and expansion attractive after
a firm undergoes an LBO. Zingales (1998) shows that highly levered
firms are less likely to survive, especially in more concentrated indus-
tries with high entry barriers. Khanna and Tice (2000) look at how
firm and market characteristics affect incumbents’behavior upon entry
whereas Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004) investigate the rela-
tion between competition, leverage and survival for a sample of start-
up firms, which are especially prone to predation.
Chevalier (1995b) examines the effect of a change in capital struc-
ture on firm value (stock prices) and product market competition
778(entry, exit and expansion) by investigating LBOs in the supermarket
industry. She uses the same set of firms as in Chevalier (1995a). Non-
LBO rivals find expansion and entry attractive in markets dominated
by LBO firms and their share prices respond positively to an LBO
announcement. These results support the hypothesis that increases in
debt make firms compete softer,28 while the increase in rivals’aggres-
siveness fits into the framework of predation models (e.g., Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986); Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)).
Zingales (1998) investigates how leverage affects a firm’s ability to
respond to unexpected changes in its competitive environment by
investigating its survival as independent organization. In addition, he
also examines the effects on investment and pricing decisions. His
sample consists of firms in the U.S. trucking industry, where a change
in regulation provoked an exogenous shock in the competitive frame-
work and in firm leverage. It contains 941 general freight carriers with
more than $1 million in operating revenues in 1977, and covers the
period 1977-1985. The main results are that, after controlling for effi-
ciency and the ex ante probability of exit by means of Altman’s Z-
score, highly levered firms are less likely to survive. The less com-
petitive (the more the firm belongs to the LTL market segment),29 the
stronger this effect is. With respect to investments, Zingales finds that
exiting firms suffer from an underinvestment problem linked to their
initial debt level, but he admits that this effect may be caused by unob-
served heterogeneity in firm quality. Regarding prices, he finds that
high debt reduces the price in limited competitive markets. The latter
results are different from those of Chevalier ((1995a), (1995b)) and
Phillips (1995), who find that prices rise after increases in leverage.
Zingales assigns these differences to the fact that Chevalier and
Phillips examine homogenous goods industries, where customers’per-
ceptions of the firm’s financial health do not largely influence pro-
duct prices. His results thus confirm the findings of Titman (1984)
and Maksimovic and Titman (1991). Furthermore, they also support
predation models of Telser (1966), Poitevin (1989) and Bolton and
Scharstein (1990). In sum, Zingales concludes that the relation
between prices and leverage is highly dependent on the nature of
goods and the financial position of rivals. It may thus be possible that
not the fittest (most efficient) firms survive, particularly when shallow-
pocketed firms are more prone to predation.
Khanna and Tice (2000) look at how firm and market characteris-
tics affect incumbents’behavior once a Wal-Mart discount store enters
779their market. Their sample consists of 69 discount store chains whose
three-digit Zip code markets were invaded by Wal-Mart in the period
1975-1996. In total, data is available on 1,209 firm-market pairs. Firm
characteristics include (inside and public) ownership, leverage, firm
diversification, chain size and profitability. Market characteristics
include sales growth, rival characteristics (e.g., market shares, the
chain’s dependency on this particular market) and competition
(Herfindahl index).
Khanna and Tice use an ordered probit regression model to esti-
mate the effect of firm and market characteristics on the firms’
response (expansion, no change, plant closing) to entry. First, firms
that underwent an LBO respond more aggressively, which supports
the limited liability model of Brander and Lewis (1986).30 However,
highly levered firms that did not undergo an LBO respond less aggres-
sively to Wal-Mart entry, which is inconsistent with Brander and
Lewis (1986). Next, Khanna and Tice find that in markets with no
entry, high-debt firms compete more aggressively than firms with low
debt. Other interesting results from these ordered response regression
models are that firms with higher inside ownership and larger market
shares behave less aggressively whereas larger, more profitable and
more companies behave more aggressively, ceteris paribus.
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004) examine the links between
competition, leverage and entrepreneurial exit. They develop three
main hypotheses. The first conjectures that competition is positively
related to the exit probability of start-ups. The nature of industry com-
petition is measured by industry concentration ratios and by the com-
petitive strategy measure (CSM) developed by Sundaram et al. (1996).
CSM divides markets according to whether competition is in strate-
gic complements or in strategic substitutes.31 The second hypothesis
investigates whether highly levered start-ups are more likely to exit
under competitive pressure whereas the third hypothesis suggests a
motive for the relation, in particular the existence of financial market
predation.
The empirical analysis is conducted on a data set of 235 entrepre-
neurial start-ups in Belgian manufacturing that are followed over the
period 1992-2002 and their industry (four-digit NACE) incumbents.
The results show that the likelihood of exit increases when strategic
actions are aggressive and decreases when the industry competes in
strategic substitutes; traditional concentration ratios have no significant
impact. So, CSM is found to be more representative for the nature of
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industry competition than industry concentration ratios. Also, highly
levered start-ups are more sensitive to competition, but only if com-
petition is in strategic complements. Finally, the paper shows that the
relation between leverage, CSM and survival is only significant when
the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard (measured by the
historical industry failure rate) is substantial, confirming the financial
market predation model.
V. CONCLUSIONS
So, what have we learned in two decades about the interactions
between capital structure and product markets? That product markets
influence financial structure? Yes! That they are an important determi-
nant of capital structure next to taxes, information asymmetries, agency
costs, etc.? Sometimes, it depends. Papers have shown that this can
depend on the type of product (Titman (1984); Titman and Maksimovic
(1991); Wanzenried (2003); Titman and Wessels (1988)), the relative
bargaining power between firms and NFS (Subramaniam (1998);
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (2000); Bronars and Deere (1991);
Perotti and Spier (1993); Sarig (1998); Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht
(2002); Istaitieh and Rodriguez (2003)), the type of bankruptcy costs
(Brander and Lewis (1988)), the type and degree of output market com-
petition (Showalter (1995); Schargrodsky (2002); Dasgupta and Tit-
man (1998)), the type of uncertainty in the output market (Showalter
(1995); Showalter (1999)), the elasticity of demand (Maksimovic
(1988); Dasgupta and Titman (1998)). Next to further verifying,
extending and institutionalizing the presented theoretical and empirical
work, some other challenges for future research have emerged from
the papers discussed in this article. Specifically, important avenues for
future research are to further examine the dynamics of capital structure
(e.g., how does reputation affect financing decisions) and to study the
impact of product market characteristics on corporate financing stocks
and flows (cfr. Welch (2004)).32 A good research design and data set
may further offer interesting prospects on how input and output mar-
ket behavior affects capital structure because, as shown by this review
article, the research in this area up till now is largely theoretical.
The impact of capital structure on product market behavior is almost
always an endogeneous relation. This inherent endogeneity problem
forces researchers examining the product market effects of financialpolicy to be creative in their research design. Next, theoretical work
has shown that, depending on the underlying assumptions, increases
in debt can increase (Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988))
or decrease (Faure-Grimaud (2000), Spagnolo (2000)) firm aggres-
siveness, which further imposes requirements on the research design.
The empirical results largely confirm the anti-competitive stream
(Chevalier (1995a,b); Opler and Titman (1994); Clayton and Ravid
(2002)) although some studies (e.g., Zingales (1998)) find pro-com-
petitive effects of debt. Debt can also influence a firm’s pricing (Das-
gupta and Titman (1998); Clayton and Ravid (2002); Borenstein and
Rose (1995)) and investment decisions (Dotan and Ravid (1985);
Allen (2000); Kovenock and Phillips (1997)). Finally, capital structure
decisions influence the probability of predation and exit (Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986); Poitevin (1989); Bolton and Scharfstein (1990);
Fernandez-Ruiz (2004); Maurer (1999); Lambrecht (2001); Kanatas
and Qi (2001); Khanna and Tice (2000); Huyghebaert and Van de
Gucht (2004)). Most of the papers up till now have examined how
the debt-equity mix drives these decisions, but theoretical work (e.g.,
Glazer (1994); Faure-Grimaud (2000); Hart and Moore (1995);
Kanatas and Qi (2001)) suggests that other aspects of the financing
mix may also matter. Future research examining the role of capital
structure on product market behavior therefore may greatly benefit
from taking into account the debt mix, debt maturity structure, debt
seniority structure, covenants, etc.
NOTES
1. This assumption has been disputed by Haugen and Senbet (1978), who claim that
liquidation is a capital budgeting decision that should be considered independently
from the event of bankruptcy. Debtholders can buy out stockholders and liquidate
whenever the firm is worth more dead than alive. Titman therefore assumes that a
firm can survive even when its liquidation value exceeds its operating value thanks to
transaction costs and free-rider problems (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980)).
2. It is assumed that the firm cannot issue debt of higher priority than its currently out-
standing debt. If not, it would have less incentives to expropriate existing creditors by
reducing quality as it can more efficiently expropriate them by issuing senior debt.
3. By contrast, Titman (1984) finds that firms selling highly differentiated products take
on less debt as customers price the expected liquidation costs associated with higher
leverage.
4. When demand will be high, the levered firm will produce the same output as if it was
uninformed.
5. By contrast, Greer (2002) shows that in the presence of a quantity leader, long-term
debt can have competitive effects. The reason is that the follower’s incentives to
appease the leader in earlier periods are drawn out by an increased risk of bankruptcy.
7826. In an extension of his model, Faure-Grimaud (2000) finds similar results albeit under
a different mechanism. In his model, firms decrease first-period output to increase the
odds of getting a reward when performance is bad. In the last period, firms act more
aggressively as they no longer need refinancing.
7. This reward can take many forms, such as giving back some asset initially pledged as
collateral, providing additional funds for good performers or allocating a private or
reputational benefit to the firm’s shareholders.
8. Investment and production decisions do not entirely coincide when firms decide to
invest in idle capacity.
9. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that when a firm has non-debt related tax shields,
debt becomes more expensive if it cannot shield any income from taxes.
10. This assumption is hard to maintain when firms with positive NPV projects have
access to perfect capital markets.
11. The reason is that firms with high bankruptcy costs can renegotiate better con-
tract terms than firms with low bankruptcy costs, which may result in a competi-
tive advantage for the firm and even reverse the order in which firms are expected
to exit.
12. Their results are confirmed by Hovakimiam et al. (2001). Conversely, Welch
(2004) finds no significant evidence that R&D/sales and selling expenses/sales
are related to financial structure. Welch, however, points out that the proxies used
by Titman and Wessels may be more related to asset intangibility than to product
uniqueness.
13. Throughout the paper, the authors argue that screening and monitoring performed by
banks in start-ups likely differs from that in established firms. For example, banks
choose to finance a smaller fraction in firms that face large adverse selection problems,
which is contrary to what has been found for large, listed firms.
14. Welch finds that adding twenty ‘determinants’ of capital structure to a model with
only stock price effects raises the R2 from 43% to 54% in a k=1 equation and from
40% to 59% in a k=5 equation.
15. Sarig (1998) also adds some empirical evidence to his theoretical framework. He finds
that after controlling for industry-specific determinants of wages and leverage, the
share of profits received by employees is increasing in leverage. However, his dataset
only allows for intra-industry comparisons. By contrast, Bronars and Deere (1991)
show that firms facing a higher probability of unionization, measured by the fraction
of industry employees that are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, main-
tain higher debt-equity ratios. The latter result is also consistent with Perotti and Spier
(1993), who argue that by exchanging debt for equity, a firm can extract concessions
from (unionized) workers.
16. Median sales growth and median stock returns below the 30%-percentile, which are
calculated across all three-digit SIC industries. The drop in sales can be interpreted as
demand uncertainty.
17. Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) provide evidence that product market competition
reduces agency problems of equity. They split up their sample of 165 U.S. companies
into generalists and specialists, according to whether they service the entire market or
target a niche. They find that future profitability is significantly positively related to
leverage changes for specialists and significantly negatively for generalists. They show
that competition reduces managerial slack and find support for Jensen’s (1986) free
cash flow theory when competition is weak and for Myers’(1984) pecking order the-
ory when competition is strong.
18. When firms set quantities (Cournot competition) instead of prices, the strategic invest-
ment model shows that after increasing debt, the firm still produces less and its rival
produces more, but now the firm’s own profits are lower. So, it is better off without
debt.
78319. The two definitions largely coincide, except for two-digit SIC industries 30, 
32, 38.
20. The average industry debt ratio is included as regressor variable. Also, a variable that
interacts marginal revenue with a dummy variable that equals one following the recapi-
talization is included in the regression.
21. To further test this interpretation, Phillips examines whether managers’ and share-
holders’ incentives become more aligned after recapitalizations. For this purpose, he
compares pay-performance measures over a 15-year window by regressing changes in
executive compensation on changes in shareholder wealth, stock returns, returns
on assets and changes in sales. The results show that changes in compensation are
positively related to changes in shareholder value for the period following the
recapitalization, but not for the period before. During the latter period, executive com-
pensation is significantly related to changes in sales, which is consistent with manage-
rial empire building.
22. Depending on whether prices are below or above their value-maximizing level, firms
will raise or cut prices during recessions. Switching cost models assume prices are
below whereas collusion models assume prices are above this level. As a result,
switching cost models predict that prices will be increased during recessions.
23. This is the operating margin in the industry, corrected for the procyclical effect of
fixed costs (see Hall (1988)).
24. The correlation between log detrended capital expenditures, respectively log detrended
inventories and log detrended GNP.
25. The supermarket industry does have the disadvantage that customer switching costs
play only a minor role and that the food industry is less cyclical than other industries.
26. Clayton and Ravid (2002) pose that the choice of leverage is endogenous. To measure
the effect of leverage on auction bids, they therefore control for firm characteristics
and bankruptcy risk. Even though leverage is significant, the bankruptcy measures are
insignificantly related to the firm’s highest bid.
27. The authors blame the unexpected results for the interest coverage ratio on the noise
in this variable. Operating income can vary dramatically from period to period, and if
a firm experiences a period of low operating income, the interest coverage ratio can
fall below 1.0 or even become negative.
28. The toughness of price competition in two markets differs if, holding constant these
markets’ concentration, price-cost margins in these markets differ (Sutton (1991)).
Chevalier assumes that this definition of (price) competition also includes quality com-
petition, without distinguishing between both.
29. The two main segments of the trucking industry are the truckload (TL) and the less-
than-truckload (LTL) segment, where the second has less collateralizable assets, needs
more specific investments (and thus higher entry barriers and more possibilities to sell
differentiated goods), and is less competitive. Zingales divides the sample into three
groups according to whether firms belong more or less to the TL segment and con-
siders differences in results across the three groups as stemming from differences in
the competitive setting.
30. This result is not in line with earlier research by Phillips (1995), Chevalier (1995a, b),
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), who find that firms that underwent an LBO become
less aggressive.
31. More specifically, CSM looks at whether the firm’s marginal profits are increasing or
decreasing in competitor outputs. Under strategic complements, firms match strategic
moves, and thus compete more fiercely.
32. A firm’s financing stock is its debt ratio, which can be compared to its target ratio
(which results from weighing the static benefits and costs of debt). A firm’s financing
flows are the specific incremental choices between different securities, and depend
more on information and contracting.
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